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COURTS THWART WAGE RIGHTS BY
MISAPPLYING CLASS ACTION RULES
SCOTT A. MOSS & NANTIYA RUAN

*

Courts apply to wage rights cases an aggressive scrutiny that not only
disadvantages low-wage workers, but is fundamentally incorrect on the law. Rule 23
class actions automatically cover all potential members if the court grants plaintiffs’
class certification motion. But for certain employment rights cases—mainly wage
claims but also age discrimination and gender equal pay claims—29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
allows not class actions but “collective actions” covering just those opting in
affirmatively. Yet courts in collective actions assume a gatekeeper role just as they do
in Rule 23 class actions, disallowing many actions by requiring a certification motion
proving strict commonality among members.
This Article argues that conditioning § 216(b) collective actions on certification
motions proving commonality is incorrect. Section 216(b) is not an opt-in version of
Rule 23; it is a liberalized form of simple Rule 20 joinder, which permits joint suit
whenever claims share one common issue and address related events. No text
authorizes any § 216(b) certification inquiry, nor is judicial gatekeeping justified by
economic logic: Rule 23 classes present principal-agent and asymmetric information
problems because lead plaintiffs may inadequately represent unengaged members, but
all § 216(b) collective actions members are full plaintiffs with individual claims,
obviating the need for judicial scrutiny.
Wage rights cases commonly are high-impact challenges to entire industry pay
practices, seeking millions in unpaid wages for thousands of workers. Especially for
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low-wage workers, disallowing collective actions ends the claims; individual suits are
cost-prohibitive. Even when collective actions proceed, certification motions yield cost
and delay, thwarting claims and deterring attorneys.
Courts should presumptively allow collective actions whenever workers for the same
employer press the same statutory claims. Defendants should bear the burden of
challenging collective actions in a Rule 21 misjoinder or Rule 12 dismissal motion.
This Article provides two explanations for such pervasive judicial error. In a complex,
once-obscure field, courts heavily relied upon early precedent that proved incorrect,
yielding path-dependent “lock-in” of bad law. Less charitably, courts’ mishandling of
collective actions is just another example of federal courts erecting procedural hurdles
to rights-vindicating litigation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................ 526
I. How § 216(b) Collective Actions Differ from Rule 23 Class
Actions ...................................................................................... 530
A. Rule 23 Class Actions: Close Scrutiny to Guard
Against Agency Problems in Automatic-Inclusion
Classes ................................................................................ 530
B. Collective Actions:
Opt-In Required by Statute,
Certification Motion Required by Judicial Practice,
and Certification Frequently Denied ............................... 532
1. Early § 216(b) history: facilitating aggregation of
wage claims ................................................................... 533
2. Modern § 216(b) case law: split authority but a
common theme and many collective actions
rejected ......................................................................... 535
II. How Courts Are Wrong ............................................................ 539
A. Why No Certification Inquiry: The Text, History, and
Nature of § 216(b)............................................................. 539
1. Statutory text and purpose: no judicial authority in
§ 216(b) to veto plaintiffs’ litigation choices .............. 539
2. No motion and just one common issue required by
rules that closely parallel § 216(b): Rule 20 joinder
and original Rule 23(a)(3) “spurious class actions”... 542
a. Collective actions as liberalized joinder, not
Rule 23-style class actions ...................................... 542
b. Collective actions as parallel to original Rule
23(a)(3) “spurious” opt-in classes requiring no
“certification” motion ............................................ 545
3. How the error started: few precedents until a
1990s conflation of approving “notice” and
approving collective actions themselves ..................... 549
4. Less need for judicial scrutiny under § 216(b) than
Rule 23: claims are presumptively similar, and optin lessens “agency” concern......................................... 553
a. The presumptively similar nature of § 216(b)

MOSS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE SECOND-CLASS CLASS ACTION

3/20/2012 7:49 PM

525

claims lessens the need for judicial scrutiny of
commonality .......................................................... 553
b. Lack of agency problems because § 216(b)
requires opt-in, not automatic inclusion .............. 555
B. Serious Consequences of the Erroneous Certification
Motion Process .................................................................. 559
1. The high stakes: widespread, high-dollar wage
violations....................................................................... 560
2. Aggregate litigation is the sole feasible
enforcement mechanism for masses of individually
small claims .................................................................. 561
3. Importance of notification for workers unaware of
violations....................................................................... 564
4. The impact of certification motions: litigation
cost; delay as limitations periods run; and fewer
attorneys available ........................................................ 566
III. Courts Should Allow Plaintiffs to File Collective Actions
Freely, Without Certification Motions ..................................... 567
A. Existing Calls for Reform: Stricter Scrutiny Versus
Broader Certification—But No Questioning of the
Premise ............................................................................... 568
B. The Prescription: Allow Plaintiffs to File Together,
Leaving the Burden on Defendants to Challenge
Similarity, Without Judicial “Gatekeeping” Power........... 569
1. Plaintiff’s role: to file collective actions at will, in
the same manner as multiple-plaintiff captions
under joinder rules ...................................................... 570
2. Defendant’s role: to file misjoinder or dismissal
motions, with the burden of disproving sufficient
commonality for joinder.............................................. 570
3. Court’s role: to decide parties’ motions and police
ethics violations ............................................................ 572
a. Deciding parties’ motions on the propriety of
collective actions and court-ordered notice ......... 572
b. Policing violations of ethics rules when jointly
representing multiple plaintiffs ............................ 573
C. Ramifications of the Prescription:
Fewer Costly
Motions and Improper Denials; Minimal Risk of
Excessive Collective Actions .............................................. 575
IV. Why Courts Make These Errors: Innocent and Less
Innocent Explanations ............................................................. 578
A. Path Dependence: In a Complex, Once-Obscure
Field, Relying on Precedent That Proves Misguided ....... 578
B. Hostility to Litigation As a Tool of Dispute Resolution
and Social Reform ............................................................. 580
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 582

MOSS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

526

3/20/2012 7:49 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:523

INTRODUCTION
1

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes heightened the degree of
2
“commonality” required in a class action and thereby rejected a
3
nationwide sex discrimination class action. Because of a decades-old
misapplication of class action law, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Wal-Mart Stores may undercut not only class actions, but also the
procedurally distinct “collective actions” that let masses of workers
sue for unpaid wages.
Plaintiffs with similar claims need not bring a class action, of
4
course; joinder rules let them just file one joint complaint. But
joinder becomes infeasible with too many plaintiffs, so a few named
plaintiffs can file a class action for a large group. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 compels class action plaintiffs to file a motion for
5
“class certification,” applying the seven-part test of Rule 23(a)–(b); a
certified class automatically includes all within the class definition,
6
with no need for each individual to join affirmatively.
Rule 23, however, is trumped by the special procedure established
7
in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for certain employment claims —mainly for
unpaid minimum or overtime wages, but also for age discrimination
8
For those claims, § 216(b)
and gender wage discrimination.
authorizes not automatic-inclusion class actions, but opt-in collective
actions: “No employee shall be a party” without filing a “consent in
9
writing” and being “similarly situated” to the others.
While the § 216(b) “similarly situated” language would seem to
demand less than the substantial commonality of Rule 23, courts
subject § 216(b) collective actions to rules largely paralleling Rule
10
23.
Courts require plaintiffs to move for collective action
1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring “questions of law or fact common to the
class”).
3. See Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (finding plaintiffs lacked “commonality”
because “claims must depend upon a common contention,” like violations by “the
same supervisor,” or another issue “capable of classwide resolution—which means
that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke”).
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1).
5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b) (requiring that plaintiffs must satisfy the four
elements of Rule 23(a)(1)–(4), plus any one of the three requirements of Rule
23(b)(1)–(3)).
6. Id.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
8. See Daniel V. Dorris, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage-and-Hour
Law Claims, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2009) (explaining that wage claims are the
most common claim type, comprising nearly one in five of all federal class or
collective actions).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
10. See infra Part I.B.2.
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“certification” paralleling the Rule 23 class certification motion. On
that motion, courts impose on plaintiffs a burden of proof of a
“stricter” degree of commonality than Rule 20 joinder, under which
plaintiffs must show there are not “disparate factual and employment
12
settings” or individualized defenses. Courts thus disallow collective
actions even by workers claiming the same employer violated the
same wage rule; for example, if workers had different supervisors,
13
worksites, or pay schemes.
This Article argues that courts handle § 216(b) cases
fundamentally incorrectly. After Part I details how courts apply Rule
23 and § 216(b), Part II.A then describes the many problems with the
§ 216(b) jurisprudence. Part II.A first argues that no collective action
“certification motion” is authorized by rule, by statute, by historical
practice, or by the logic under which such motions exist in class
actions. Because § 216(b) lacks the motion requirement of Rule 23,
collective actions should be filed freely, just as the original version of
Rule 23 featured no certification motion for “spurious” opt-in class
14
actions closely paralleling § 216(b) cases. Moreover, whereas Rule
23 covers all class members automatically, § 216(b) collective actions
adjudicate the claims of only those opting in. As a result, § 216(b)
15
collective actions lack the key “principal-agent” problem justifying
courts’ role as gatekeepers scrutinizing Rule 23 classes: that class
actions adjudicate the claims of even those unaware of the case, an
16
“asymmetric information” problem that leaves absent class members
17
at the mercy of class counsel.
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir. 2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
13. See infra notes 75–85 and accompanying text.
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938).
15. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 609 (5th ed.
2001) (defining a principal-agent problem as “agents pursu[ing] their own goals
even when doing so entails lower profits for . . . principals”).
16. Id. at 596.
17. See, e.g., John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private
Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1451 (2005) (asserting that the role of class
counsel in “hold[ing] renegade corporations accountable” trumps recovery for class
members (internal quotation marks omitted)); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation
Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 291–92 (2010)
(discussing checks on the system of “entrepreneurial litigation” by lawyers that create
“principal-agent” problems); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’
Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1991) (asserting that the
“existing regulatory system” to protect “absent class members” is “poorly designed”).
But see Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104 (2006) (“[T]he
so-called ‘agency cost’ problem is mostly a mirage.”).
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Part II.A next argues that on § 216(b) certification motions, courts
wrongly demand strict Rule 23 commonality, not the more liberal
Rule 20 joinder requirement of one common issue. Enacted in 1938
18
and amended in 1947, § 216(b) was not a tightened opt-in version of
Rule 23; it was a liberalized version of simple Rule 20 joinder, which
allowed joint suits by plaintiffs with just one common issue. By
allowing “similarly situated” plaintiffs to join, § 216(b) aimed to
facilitate, not restrict, joinder of presumptively similar coworker wage
claims.
Part II.B then explains how courts’ improperly high § 216(b)
threshold imposes troubling consequences, starting with the rejection
of meritorious collective actions. Where wage violations go without
remedy, the law goes without vindication; the cost is substantial,
especially for low-income workers. Even when courts allow collective
actions, the complex certification motion and the necessary
preliminary discovery generate delay and cost. The delay eliminates
the claims of workers whose statutes of limitations keep running until
they can opt in; the cost means fewer claims are prosecuted, with
large cases litigated by only a few major class action firms instead of a
broad range of smaller or nonprofit firms. Courts’ misstep in
applying Rule 23 to § 216(b) cases is all the more troubling because
the heightened Rule 23 “commonality” requirement in Wal-Mart
Stores has the potential to largely limit employment class actions to
addressing uniformly imposed unlawful policies.
Part III offers a prescription for how courts should handle § 216(b)
collective actions without any “certification motion” or strict
commonality standard. Properly interpreted, § 216(b) should let
claims proceed as collective actions presumptively on a simple prima
facie showing that workers press (a) the same statutory claim (e.g., a
minimum wage violation, not wage claims mixed with discrimination
claims) by (b) the same employer. With no “certification motion,”
proper defendants should bear the burden of challenging collective
actions in either Rule 21 misjoinder or Rule 12 dismissal motions,
paralleling practice in closely analogous “spurious” opt-in class
actions under old Rule 23.
With the opt-in rule lessening the asymmetric information and
principal-agent problem of unaware class members, courts should not
wield intrusive Rule 23-style powers over plaintiffs’ litigation choices.
Rather, courts simply should grant or deny defense misjoinder or
dismissal motions and supervise any court-ordered notification to
18. H.R. REP. NO. 80-71 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030–32.
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potential plaintiffs that is requested. Still, collective actions are
complex, and the same counsel represents plaintiffs of varied
engagement levels; so some asymmetric information and principalagent problems remain, though not much more than in most nonclass litigation. To police any remaining asymmetric information and
principal-agent problems in § 216(b) cases, courts should carefully
apply ethics rules requiring attorneys to keep clients informed,
respect client decision-making autonomy, avoid client conflicts of
interest, and competently represent clients.
Part IV concludes by discussing how the § 216(b) case law ended
up so wrong. Part of the answer is that collective actions are much
less known and studied than class actions; the few publications on §
19
216(b) collective actions are mainly litigators’ practice pieces or
20
student notes. Although the statute is old, the lack of attention is
attributable to the fact that § 216(b) actions were obscure until a
21
1990s proliferation of high-impact cases. Now, one in five aggregate
22
(class or collective) lawsuits is a wage case, typically a multi-million
dollar action by hundreds or thousands of employees claiming years
23
24
of unpaid minimum or overtime wages, that challenges entire
19. See, e.g., David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation of Wage and Hour Collective
Actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 129, 130 (2003)
(describing “the development of the collective action as a means of private Fair
Labor Standards Act enforcement and the issues that have arisen in implementing
these procedures”); Allan G. King & Camille C. Ozumba, Strange Fiction: The “Class
Certification” Decision in FLSA Collective Actions, 24 LAB. LAW. 267, 267 (2009) (asserting
that procedural rules for collective actions under the FLSA “needlessly discard the
carefully balanced trade-offs between efficiency and due process struck by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).
20. See, e.g., James M. Fraser, Note, Opt-In Class Actions Under the FLSA, EPA, and
ADEA: What Does It Mean to Be “Similarly Situated”?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 98
(2004) (emphasizing that differences between § 216(b) and Rule 23 “resulted largely
by mistake”); Brian R. Gates, Note, A “Less Stringent” Standard? How to Give FLSA §
16(b) a Life of Its Own, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1521 (2005) (arguing that
instead of being analyzed merely as “‘less stringent’” than the Federal Rules, § 216
should “claim its own place in the federal court system”); Daniel C. Lopez, Note,
Collective Confusion: FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class Actions, and the Rules Enabling
Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 278–79 (2009) (concluding that § 216 is an “antiquated
vestige” that should be repealed).
21. See infra Part II.A.3.
22. Dorris, supra note 8, at 1251.
23. See, e.g., Acevedo v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 518 (5th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (describing plaintiffs as eight hundred former employees of
defendant “seeking payment of unpaid wages”); Zivali v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 784 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (providing that plaintiffs alleged their employer
“failed to pay wages . . . in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act”).
24. See, e.g., Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1239–40 (11th
Cir. 2008) (explaining that plaintiffs “used Family Dollar’s payroll records to
establish that 1,424 store managers routinely worked 60 to 70 hours a week and to
quantify the overtime wages owed to each [of them]”); Archuleta v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 543 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008) (determining whether full-time
pharmacists fell within the overtime exemption under FLSA for “‘executive,
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25

industry pay practices. Furthermore, as § 216(b) is a complex, onceobscure field of law, a small body of precedent, particularly one
misconstrued decision, initially got it wrong; the American legal
system’s respect for precedent resulted in “path dependence” that
“locked in” this erroneous case. A second, less charitable explanation
for this erroneous case law is the federal courts’ hostility to individual
rights litigation. Especially as to procedural matters, courts display an
agenda of limiting rights litigation, with rulings expanding dispositive
motions, compelling arbitration, pre-empting state court litigation—
and, as this Article discusses—erecting misguided barriers to major
aggregate litigation.
I.

HOW § 216(b) COLLECTIVE ACTIONS DIFFER FROM RULE 23 CLASS
ACTIONS
A. Rule 23 Class Actions: Close Scrutiny to Guard Against Agency
Problems in Automatic-Inclusion Classes

Class actions under Rule 23 cover varied subject matter, from
common-law consumer fraud and mass torts claims to federal
26
statutory antitrust and civil rights claims. Rule 23(a) imposes four
conditions for a class action:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the

administrative or professional’ employees”).
25. See, e.g., Cheatham v. Allstate Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 578, 584–85 (5th Cir. 2006)
(per curiam) (affirming a district court holding that plaintiffs “were employed in an
administrative capacity and thus exempt from 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)’s requirement of
overtime compensation for employment in excess of forty hours”); Lee v. ABC
Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D. 193, 196–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing employer’s
practice of characterizing carpet installation mechanics as “independent contractors”
and the mechanics’ contention that they be considered “employee[s]” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp.
2d 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (addressing whether plaintiffs were “independent
contractors or employees entitled to be paid a minimum wage and time-and-a-half
for overtime”).
26. Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions after the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (2006) (“[Rule 23(b)(2)] lead to the civil rights and
institutional reform class actions of the 1970s and 1980s that resulted in significant
changes in . . . governmental institutions and private businesses. [Rule 23(b)(3)]
lead initially to class actions based on . . . antitrust, securities fraud, and employment
discrimination, but, by the 1980s and 1990s, migrated to a broad spectrum of
commercial, consumer protection, environmental, product liability, and mass tort
cases.”).
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representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
27
interests of the class.

A class also must qualify as one of the three types in Rule 23(b),
28
defined mainly by the relief sought. The least common, contained
in Rule 23(b)(1), applies when separate actions risk multiple court
29
orders inconsistent with each other or the rights of non-parties.
Rule 23(b)(2) applies when members seek mainly injunctive or
declaratory relief against a party who acted “on grounds that apply
30
generally to the class,” as in lawsuits against segregation or pollution.
31
Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) applies to money damages claims, making it
most similar to § 216(b) wage collective actions. A Rule 23(b)(3)
class requires that common issues “predominate” over individual
ones and that a class action be “superior to other” options, such as
32
many individual suits.
Courts on class certification motions serve as gatekeepers,
undertaking a “rigorous analysis” of whether evidence establishes
33
each Rule 23 element. The Court in Wal-Mart Stores stressed this in
holding that a class of 1.5 million plaintiffs failed to prove sufficiently
“common questions” and in suggesting that the tougher
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), rather than 23(b)(2), are more
proper for a class seeking substantial damages, not just injunctive
34
relief. Certification receives close scrutiny because a Rule 23 class
automatically includes and litigates all members’ claims with finality.
Members must affirmatively opt out to be excluded, and they are
35
guaranteed opt-out rights only in Rule 23(b)(3) damages classes.
Whether or not opting out is possible, class actions are criticized for
causing “agency problems” in that most members participate

27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1); see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
614 (1997) (applying Rule 23(b)(1) where the party “is obliged by law to treat the
members of the class alike (a utility acting toward customers; a government imposing
a tax).or where the party must treat all alike as a matter of practical necessity”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
31. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
33. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); see Amchem Prods.,
521 U.S. at 613–14 (citing the four threshold requirements applicable to all class
actions).
34. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011).
35. See, e.g., Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(collecting circuit court decisions in limited fund and employment discrimination
class actions in which the courts held that (b)(1) or (b)(2) members do not enjoy
mandatory notice or opt-out rights under Rule 23, but “it is within judicial discretion
to . . . [grant] such rights”).
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minimally, if at all, in the case, allowing counsel and the few named
36
plaintiffs to neglect or “sell out” the interests of the class.
B. Collective Actions: Opt-In Required by Statute, Certification Motion
Required by Judicial Practice, and Certification Frequently Denied
For minimum or overtime wage claims under the Fair Labor
37
Standards Act (FLSA), age discrimination claims under the Age
38
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and gender wage
39
discrimination claims under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. §
40
41
216(b) trumps Rule 23, authorizing collective actions very different
from Rule 23 classes.
36. See infra Part II.A.4.b (describing how the few decisionmakers can neglect or
“sell out” the interests of the class).
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006). Collective actions are typically FLSA claims,
but for ADEA cases, see, for example, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165,
167 (1989) (addressing whether “a district court conducting [an ADEA suit] may
authorize and facilitate notice of the pending action”); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital
Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001) (observing that “[c]lass actions under
the ADEA are authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), which expressly borrows the opt-in
class action mechanism of the [FLSA]”); Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1090
(11th Cir. 1996) (deciding on interlocutory appeal the district judge’s order creating
an opt-in class for store managers who “allege[d] that their demotions or
terminations were motivated by age-discrimination in violation of the [ADEA]”);
Krueger v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 163 F.R.D. 446, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying plaintiffs’
motion to “bifurcate liability and damage issues” in ADEA class action).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). EPA claims are the least common collective action type,
but for examples, see Collins v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1330–
31 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (granting defendant’s motion to decertify in case brought by
female store managers claiming they were paid less than their male counterparts);
Jarvaise v. Rand Corp., 212 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002) (granting certification for
limited class of three women alleging EPA violations).
40. Arguments that Rule 23 trumps § 216(b), a federal statute, have consistently
failed. See, e.g., Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1977)
(noting “[t]he clear weight of authority holds that Rule 23 procedures are
inappropriate for the prosecution of class actions under s 216(b)” and collecting
cases); Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co., 527 F.2d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(“Rule 23 cannot be invoked to circumvent the [§ 216(b)] consent . . . . [Courts]
have uniformly ruled that . . . Rule 23 [is] not applicable to [§ 216(b) cases].”);
LaChapelle v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288–89 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(finding a “fundamental, irreconcilable difference between” Rule 23 and § 216(b),
and that the court “must apply [§ 216(b)] as it has been written” because it is
“unambiguous”); Wright v. U.S. Rubber Co., 69 F. Supp. 621, 624 (S.D. Iowa 1946)
(observing that § 216(b) “supersedes the Rules of Civil Procedure and is a statement
by the ‘supreme power of the state’ as to who is entitled to be made parties to a
suit”).
A group of employment defense litigators recently argued that Rule 23 does,
and should, apply to § 216(b) collective actions. Their argument was based on the
theory that Rule 23, as a validly enacted rule under the Rules Enabling Act, is not
inconsistent with § 216(b) and thus should apply to § 216(b) actions. Allan G. King
et al., You Can’t Opt Out of the Federal Rules: Why Rule 23 Certification Standards Should
Apply to Opt-In Collective Actions Under the FLSA, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011). This
Article, however, sees the § 216(b) procedure, as originally envisioned and as
properly applied, as a liberalized, party-initiated rather than court-supervised joinder
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1.

Early § 216(b) history: facilitating aggregation of wage claims
Enacted in 1938 as part of the FLSA and applicable to later
employment laws codified in the same statutory chapter, § 216(b)
provides that “[a]n action . . . may be maintained against any
employer . . . by any one or more employees for . . . other employees
42
similarly situated.” Under the initial statutory language, “collective
actions” let employees have third-parties, mainly labor unions, file
their wage suits—which drew colorful denouncements that such
lawsuits filed by “an outsider, perhaps someone who is desirous of
stirring up litigation without being an employee at all . . . may result
43
in very decidedly unwholesome champertous situations.”
To
eliminate third-party suits, Congress amended § 216(b) in 1947 to
44
require workers themselves to be the plaintiffs and to require
anyone other than an original plaintiff to affirmatively “opt in” by
45
filing a written consent, thereby codifying the opt-in rule already
46
prevailing among the courts.
47
Enacted before modern class actions existed, § 216(b) does not
mention any judicial gatekeeping power over whether a case can

procedure wholly inconsistent with the restrictive (rather than liberal) and judicially
supervised (rather than party-initiated) procedure Rule 23 grants for class actions.
Because applying Rule 23 to § 216(b) actions would substantially eliminate the
applicability to § 216(b)-specific procedures, the proper statutory construction is to
enforce Rule 23 for all actions except those governed by 216(b): “[w]hen there are
two [federal] acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both,”
Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 609 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United
States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted),
under the “repeatedly stated” rule that where two statutes “are in tension,” both
“continue to apply” absent “irreconcilable conflict” or “clearly expressed
congressional intention” to curtail one, Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
43. 93 CONG. REC. 2182 (1947), quoted in Arrington v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 531 F.
Supp. 498, 501 (D.D.C. 1982).
44. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)); see Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft:
How Courts Use Procedural Rules to Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63
VAND. L. REV. 727, 731–32 (2010) (citing Fraser, supra note 20, at 98) (observing that
the earlier version of the statute enabled uninterested parties to launch numerous
“fishing expeditions [that] were costly to employers”).
45. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989) (noting
that the 1947 Portal-to-Portal Act added a “requirement that an employee file a
written consent”).
46. See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853–56 (3d Cir. 1945) (noting that
before the 1947 opt-in statute, most courts let § 216(b) cases cover only those
employees who affirmatively opted in).
47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (explaining that
Congress enacted the modern version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure several
decades after the FLSA).
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48

proceed as a collective action. Section § 216(b) requires merely that
49
members be “similarly situated” and opt in individually. One of the
first § 216(b) cases denied a motion to dismiss after adopting a liberal
50
definition of “similarly situated.”
The court in McReynolds v.
51
Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. observed that workers joining a
collective action “stand or fall along with” the named plaintiff, so if
their claims fail, it will be at the later stage when the evidence does
52
not “sustain the allegation that . . . [all] are similarly situated.” The
“similarity” required was modest in other early decisions allowing §
53
216(b) collective actions, such as McNorrill v. Gibbs, which found “no
serious question about the two employees being similarly situated”
when “both worked for the same employer during substantially the
same period of time, and as stated in the complaint they ‘performed
54
similar duties and were paid wages at the same time.’” Other early
cases noted the importance of “liberally administer[ing]” § 216(b) to
55
avoid “a multiplicity of suits” and because of the importance of
collective actions to workers:
[E]mployees . . . can join in their litigation so that no one of them
need stand alone in doing something likely to incur the displeasure
of an employer. It brings something of the strength of collective
56
bargaining to a collective lawsuit.

Some early courts, though, did not accept that the § 216(b)
similarity standard was any broader than then-existing Rule 23 class
57
action requirements. In Sinclair v. United States Gypsum Co., the court
struck down a complaint alleging wage claims on behalf of plaintiffs
and others “similarly situated,” reasoning that the § 216(b) suit failed
Rule 23 elements, including that the class be “so numerous as to
58
make [joinder] impracticable,” even though § 216(b) had no
numerical threshold.

48. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
49. Id.
50. McReynolds v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 5 F.R.D. 61, 62 (W.D. Ky.
1942).
51. 5 F.R.D. 61 (W.D. Ky. 1942).
52. Id. at 62.
53. 45 F. Supp. 363 (E.D.S.C. 1942).
54. Id. at 365.
55. Barrett v. Nat’l Malleable & Steel Castings Co., 68 F. Supp. 410, 416 (W.D. Pa.
1946) (“[Section 216(b)] should be liberally administered since it may be that other
persons interested in the same common question of law or facts might desire to join
as party plaintiffs and by . . . being permitted . . . a litigious situation would be
corrected at one time.”).
56. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945).
57. 75 F. Supp. 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1948).
58. Id. at 441–42.
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2.

Modern § 216(b) case law: split authority but a common theme and
many collective actions rejected
With the dramatic increase in the number of FLSA cases since the
59
1990s, the modern § 216(b) case law is far more extensive than, and
quite contrary to, the early cases detailed above. Whether or not
expressly citing Rule 23, courts adjudicating § 216(b) collective
actions perform an essentially similar analysis, requiring of plaintiffs
an evidentiary motion proving a substantial degree of commonality,
60
as Rule 23 does.
Under one approach, courts explicitly apply the Rule 23(a) class
action requirements to determine whether employees in a § 216(b)
collective action are “similarly situated”: whether the members are
sufficiently numerous (Rule 23(a)(1)); whether common claims
predominate (Rule 23(a)(2)–(3)); and whether there are conflicts of
61
interest among the plaintiffs or their counsel (Rule 23(a)(3)–(4)).
While conceding that § 216(b) differs from, and cannot be trumped
by, Rule 23, these courts have applied to collective actions all Rule 23
elements not flatly inconsistent with § 216(b), including the four
Rule 23(a) requirements, plus the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement for
damages claims that common questions must “predominate” over
62
individual ones. Some courts similarly require collective actions to
establish the substantial commonality required of damages class
actions under the original, pre-1966 version of Rule 23—because that
rule, like § 216(b), required each plaintiff with damages claims to
63
“opt in.”
59. See infra notes 154–156 and accompanying text.
60. For case dockets with scheduling orders requiring collective action
certification motions, see, for example, Capsolas v. Pasta Res. Inc., No. 10-5595
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2010) (scheduling order); Calibuso v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 092674 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009) (case management plan and scheduling order); Clarke
v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 08-2400 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2009) (stipulation and
order of discovery and briefing schedule).
61. See, e.g., Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 266–68 (D.
Colo. 1990) (specifying that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the “normal class
actions requirements,” such as “numerosity, typicality, [and] adequacy”), abrogated in
part by Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001); St.
Leger v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 123 F.R.D. 567, 569 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that
certification was inappropriate and plaintiffs were not similarly situated because
common questions did not “predominate” individual questions).
62. See, e.g., Burns v. Vill. of Wauconda, No. 99-C-0800, 1999 WL 529574, at *2–3
(N.D. Ill. July 15, 1999) (denying certification on same Rule 23 analysis of § 216(b)
certification as Shushan); Camp v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. H-97-1938, 1998 WL
906915, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 1998) (citing Shushan and requiring § 216(b)
plaintiffs to satisfy Rule 23); Wilkerson v. Martin Marietta Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1456,
1461 (D. Colo. 1995) (citing Shushan in applying the Rule 23 class action
requirements).
63. See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 855 F.2d 1062, 1078–79 (3d Cir. 1988) (observing
that “those who did not file individual charges and nevertheless forge ahead with
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Most courts, however, do not expressly apply Rule 23, instead
taking an “ad hoc” approach to whether workers are “similarly
situated” enough for a § 216(b) collective action. These courts apply
a two-stage certification process that, though unique to § 216(b), still
parallels key Rule 23 requirements; particularly, that class members
must share strict commonality and that a collective action would be
64
superior to multiple individual suits.
The process begins with the plaintiffs first filing a motion, as under
65
Rule 23, seeking court “certification” of the collective action. Often
called the “notice stage,” at this step the court decides whether a
collective action is sufficiently proper to justify notifying potential
66
members that they can opt into a collective action. Court approval
of notice derives from the Supreme Court decision in Hoffmann-La
67
Roche Inc. v. Sperling, which mentioned no “certification” process,
but held that to serve the “broad remedial goal” of the FLSA, and in
light of the “wisdom and necessity for early judicial intervention,”
68
courts can manage the notice and opt-in process. Courts call the
burden of proving that plaintiffs are “similarly situated” at this stage
69
“minimal”—just a “modest factual showing” —but discovery is
70
Courts require evidentiary proof (employee affidavits,
necessary.
71
corporate documents, etc.) that members are “similarly situated,”
72
challenge the same conduct, and faced “a common policy or plan

individual actions despite the district court’s erroneous ruling may find their actions
defeated on a law of the case theory”); EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 602
(10th Cir. 1980) (considering an interlocutory appeal of a district court finding that
“a prima facie case had been established showing that Sandia had engaged in a
pattern or practice of discrimination against a portion of the protected class”).
64. Lopez, supra note 20, at 288–89; see also Cuzco v. Orion Builders, Inc., 477 F.
Supp. 2d 628, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing a two-step process that courts
generally use to determine whether a collective action under FLSA may proceed);
Sipas v. Sammy’s Fishbox, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 10319 (PAC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24318, at *6–7 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006) (citing that the plaintiffs “need show
only ‘some identifiable factual nexus’” as a “minimal burden” for conditional
certification).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(c).
66. Torres v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3316 (PAC), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 74039, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006).
67. 493 U.S. 165 (1989).
68. Id. at 171–73.
69. Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 8819 (GEL), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73090, at *8–10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89, 93 n.8 (D.N.J. 1983) (“[T]he Court set
up a 45 day discovery period for . . . establishing the number of persons similarly
situated . . . . [P]laintiffs may [then] move to certify a . . . class to whom notice will
ultimately be sent.”).
71. Gjurovich v. Emmanuel’s Marketplace, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Realite v. Ark Rests. Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 303, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
72. Gjurovich, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
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73

that violated the law.” After discovery is a second-stage certification
motion, typically a defense motion to decertify; the court makes an
even more searching evidentiary inquiry into whether members are
74
75
similarly situated, decertifying the case if they are not.
Courts deny certification when they find insufficient evidence of,
76
for example, common facts among members, common policies
77
affecting all members, or common “employment settings” of all
73. Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
74. Torres v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3316 (PAC), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 74039, at *37–38 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006); Gjurovich, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 105
n.1.
75. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575 F.3d 567, 585 (6th Cir. 2009)
(affirming decertification because not all plaintiffs alleged same unlawful practices);
Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 952–53 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming
decertification because employee duties and pay structures differed); Beauperthuy v.
24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1116, 1122–27 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(granting defendant’s motions to decertify because of plaintiffs’ varying
circumstances and defendant lacking a uniform policy compelling unpaid work);
Hernandez v. United Auto Credit Corp., No. 08-3404, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40209,
at *10–15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010) (granting motion to decertify because employee
duties and authority levels differed); Brechler v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., No. cv06-00940, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24612, at *9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2009) (decertifying
class because a “subtler system of pressure and coercion,” not a unified policy,
denied wages to employees); Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 567,
576–87 (E.D. La. 2008) (decertifying class because of “the dissimilarity of plaintiffs’
self-reported job duties,” which made it “exceedingly difficult for Big Lots to assert its
statutory exemption defense on a collective basis”); Proctor v. Allsups Convenience
Stores, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 278, 282 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (granting defendant’s motion to
decertify because “there is no evidence of a single decision, policy, or plan that is
causing the Plaintiffs to work off the clock”); Sharer v. Tandberg, Inc., No. 06-626,
2007 WL 676220, at *3 (E.D. Va. Feb. 27, 2007) (granting motion to decertify
because employees’ job titles and responsibilities were too dissimilar and named
plaintiffs did not all allege same wage deprivations); Smith v. Heartland Auto. Servs.,
Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1152 (D. Minn. 2005) (decertifying upon finding
“significant the discrepancies between and among the named plaintiffs and the optin class members with respect to a Store Manager’s ability to exercise discretion,
perform management tasks, and act independently of the district manager”);
Johnson v. TGF Precision Haircutters, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-03-3641, 2005 WL 1994286,
at *2, *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2005) (decertifying because multiple sites varied and
employer defenses were individualized observing that “if it were not for [issues such
as geographic differences], the job duties per se might not require decertification”);
Bayles v. Am. Med. Response of Colo., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1053, 1061–63 (D. Colo.
1996) (decertifying because pay-docking policy was not consistent for all); Lusardi v.
Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351, 359 (D.N.J. 1987) (granting motion to decertify
because of disparate employee duties and locations among ADEA plaintiffs).
76. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Embarq Mgmt. Co., No. 6:07-cv-468, 2007 WL 4482581,
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2007) (stating that plaintiffs failed to offer any basis of
employer’s plan to deny overtime pay “on a company-wide scale” and observing that
“federal courts across the Middle and Southern Districts of Florida have routinely
denied requests for conditional certification where, as here, the plaintiffs attempt to
certify a broad class based only [on] the conclusory allegations of few employees”);
D’Anna v. M/A-Com, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 889, 894 (D. Md. 1995) (noting that plaintiff
failed to make the “modest factual showing” of an improper corporate policy and
holding that “[t]he mere listing of names, without more, is insufficient absent a
factual showing that the plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated’”).
77. See, e.g., Bishop v. Petro-Chem. Transp., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1307 (E.D. Cal.
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78

members. On claims that the same employer denied many workers
minimum and overtime wages, the district court in Sheffield v. Orius
79
Corp. denied collective action certification because “members held
different job titles, enjoyed different payment structures (piece-rate,
hourly, and salaried), and worked at nine different job sites;” with
each claim entailing individualized issues, the alleged violations arose
differently among subdivisions, so members were “not related as
80
victims of a uniform, national policy.” Similarly, in Bishop v. Petro81
Chemical Transport, a claim that an employer did not pay truck
82
drivers required overtime, the plaintiff truck driver testified that he
and other members were identical in key respects: “(a) held the
same job (truck drivers), (b) hauled similar products (bulk
petroleum products), (c) were based within the State of California
and (d) were not paid overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty
83
per week.” But the court denied certification, deeming plaintiff’s
“declaration . . . entirely deficient” because certification requires
84
“evidentiary support” of worker similarity, and at this early stage—
before discovery was completed—plaintiff had “no strong evidence of
85
company wide policies and corporate structure.”
A common thread is that many courts deny certification where
alleged wrongs were decentralized among different managers,
different sites, and different job categories—paralleling the Supreme
Court’s rejection in Wal-Mart Stores of a Rule 23 class claiming sex
86
discrimination among varied employees and managers. As detailed
below, Rule 23-style inquiry in § 216(b) collective actions is
2008) (citing Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2009) (requiring
substantial commonality and finding “no evidence . . . that there is a company wide
policy to deny, improperly, overtime to those who are entitled to overtime
compensation”); Jimenez v. Lakeside Pic-N-Pac, L.L.C., No. 1:06-CV-456, 2007 WL
4454295, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2007) (“Although Plaintiffs have presented
evidence of a uniform policy of not precisely recording their hours, they have not
come forward with any authority to suggest that this failure, in and of itself, violated
the FLSA.”); Moeck v. Gray Supply Corp., No. 03-1951, 2006 WL 42368, at *4 (D.N.J.
Jan. 6, 2006) (noting that the plaintiffs “failed to satisfy” a “more lenient standard”
than “modest factual showing” of a corporate policy).
78. See, e.g., Pfohl v. Farmers Ins. Grp., No. 03-CV-3080, 2004 WL 554834, at *2–3
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2004) (noting additional factors that determine whether plaintiffs
are similarly situated such as “the various defenses available to the defendant which
appeared to be individual to each plaintiff” and “fairness and procedural
considerations”).
79. 211 F.R.D. 411 (D. Or. 2002).
80. Id. at 413.
81. 582 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
82. Id. at 1292.
83. Id. at 1296.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1307.
86. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555–57 (2011).
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misplaced; it neglects the very different text, history, and nature of
each provision.
II. HOW COURTS ARE WRONG
The prevailing § 216(b) collective action certification process is
excessive in many ways—in its importation of Rule 23 standards, in
requiring evidentiary support on an early procedural motion, and in
the complexity of the two-stage inquiry. There is a far more
fundamental problem, however: there should be no collective action
“certification” inquiry at all because there is no statutory or rule
authority for requiring any such motion by plaintiffs.
Part II.A explains that applicable statutory and rule text does not
support judicial authority to deny § 216(b) plaintiffs the right to file
actions that other similarly situated individuals can join. This Part
also elaborates that the historical development of Rule 23 and §
216(b) confirms that § 216(b) is no analogue of modern Rule 23.
Rather, § 216(b) and the old form of Rule 23, both enacted in 1938,
liberalized joinder, allowing easy consolidation of similar damages
claims. The idea of courts scrutinizing the propriety of aggregation
arose only in 1968, when the revised Rule 23 established modern class
actions. Rule 23 classes, unlike § 216(b) actions, allow named
plaintiffs and class counsel to dispose of absent class members’
claims—an agency problem absent from collective actions, in which
all participants affirmatively choose to participate.
Part II.B then demonstrates that this is not a harmless error or a
mere procedural technicality: improper judicial scrutiny of collective
actions prejudices the rights of workers claiming violations and leaves
substantial violations without remedy.
A. Why No Certification Inquiry: The Text, History, and Nature of
§ 216(b)
1.

Statutory text and purpose: no judicial authority in § 216(b) to veto
plaintiffs’ litigation choices
Normally, courts have little say in plaintiffs’ choice of counsel,
choice to file jointly with others, or choice among permissible
procedures (e.g., using diversity jurisdiction to choose federal over
state court). Plaintiffs pursuing a class action, however, face judicial
inquiry into whether a class action is proper. In fact, pursuant to the
express language of Rule 23, they must file a motion proving the class
is proper: “the court must determine by order whether to certify the
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action as a class action” and must “appoint class counsel,” who
makes an “application” to the court showing they meet rule88
delineated criteria focusing on experience, resources, and skill.
Section 216(b), however, specifies a different procedure for a
collective action, one lacking any judicial “certification” of plaintiffs’
“application” process:
An action . . . may be maintained . . . [by] one or more employees
for . . . other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a
party plaintiff . . . unless he gives his consent in writing to become
89
such a party and such consent is filed in the court . . . .

This text does not give courts the power to scrutinize the matters
that Rule 23 regulates, such as the case’s status as aggregate litigation
and plaintiffs’ choice of counsel. There is no provision in § 216(b)
for a “certification” inquiry like in Rule 23(c)(1), no provision for
scrutiny of plaintiffs’ counsel like in Rule 23(g), and, more generally,
no requirements analogous to those in the Rule 23(a)(1)–(4) and
Rule 23(b)(1)–(3) seven-subsection labyrinth. Rather, § 216(b)
requires only two criteria: members must be “similarly situated” and
must make one of the types of employment claims covered by §
216(b) (minimum or overtime wage, age discrimination, or gender
pay discrimination).
Accordingly, regardless of whether judicial gatekeeping of
collective actions under § 216(b) is good policy, it is unauthorized.
In an adversarial legal system (like that of the United States), rather
than an inquisitorial system (like most of Europe), parties can file
and resolve lawsuits as they please, absent a specific rule granting
judges authority over parties’ decisions. Judicial scrutiny of a
settlement in a non-class action is unauthorized: lawsuits can be
settled and dismissed with mutual consent under Rule 41(a), and,
because that rule “does not . . . empower . . . court[s] to attach
90
conditions to the parties’ stipulation of dismissal,” judges are
uniformly reversed on rare occasions when they force parties to
91
disclose settlement terms.
Courts do have one modest power over § 216(b) actions: to
control “notice” of opt-in rights sent to potential members. The one
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)–(2).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
90. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994).
91. E.g., Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 2004)
(finding “serious abuse of discretion” in court ordering disclosure of confidential
settlement); Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that
settlement executes Rule 41 voluntary dismissal, “divest[ing]” court jurisdiction to
order disclosure of settlement).
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Supreme Court case on courts’ procedural powers in § 216(b)
actions, Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, was a narrow holding: §
216(b) implicitly grants courts “managerial responsibility” over the
opt-in process, and, “[b]y monitoring preparation and distribution of
the notice, a court can ensure that it is timely, accurate, and
92
informative.” The Court described such “trial court involvement in
the notice process” as “inevitable,” at least in cases with “numerous
93
plaintiffs.”
But a court’s notice decision is not a “certification” decision. The
Supreme Court held in Hoffmann-La Roche that a notice order is not a
Rule 23 certification analogue, but a simple case management order
under the modest Rule 83(b) provision, which provides that district
judges “may ‘regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent
94
with’ federal or local rules.” Notice will not even be necessary in all
cases because plaintiffs can sue alone; the opt-in requirement means
95
those who have not joined have no rights at stake in its outcome.
Notice is more powerful and comprehensive when court-ordered, but
plaintiffs can use informal notice methods. For example, ethics rules
against soliciting clients do not apply to counsel strengthening
clients’ cases by inviting co-plaintiffs; plaintiffs’ counsel can contact
96
potential class members without court approval.
The lack of
universal need for court notice further confirms that judicial power
over notice does not imply power to reject the entire collective
action.
Thus, plaintiffs can request notice and defendants can oppose it,
just as the parties did in Hoffmann-La Roche. Arguably, the “inevitable”
language of Hoffmann-La Roche lets courts sua sponte require plaintiffs
to send court-approved notice. On a contested motion on notice, the
defendant would likely make its motion challenging the entire
collective action, as detailed below, at the same time. But neither
judicial power over notice, nor plaintiffs’ motions for such notice,
provides any support for a collective action “certification” inquiry.
92. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1989).
93. Id. at 171.
94. Id. at 172 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b)).
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any
such action unless he gives his consent in writing . . . .”).
96. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101–02 (1981) (holding that order
barring plaintiffs’ counsel from inviting potential class members’ participation
“interfered” with counsel’s ability to “inform potential class members” and “obtain
information about the merits,” and that any “order limiting communications
between parties and potential class members” must be based on “specific findings . . .
[of] potential abuses . . . [and] limit[] speech as little as possible”). Gulf Oil was a
Rule 23 class action but “[t]he same justifications apply in the context of [a § 216(b)]
action.” Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 171.
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No motion and just one common issue required by rules that closely
parallel § 216(b): Rule 20 joinder and original Rule 23(a)(3) “spurious
class actions”
a.

Collective actions as liberalized joinder, not Rule 23-style class
actions

As detailed above, most courts appear to view § 216(b) as an opt-in
only variation on modern Rule 23. Section 216(b), a 1938 and 1947
statute, was never created as a variant on modern Rule 23, which was
97
enacted in 1966.
Rather, § 216(b) closely parallels a different
aggregate litigation device: as originally understood, § 216(b) is a
joinder rule, and a liberalizing one, with a streamlined process for
more plaintiffs to join a case by filing a simple “written consent.”
The one Supreme Court case on collective actions, Hoffmann-La
Roche, does not address whether such cases require “certification”
motions, nor the standard for such motions—but it repeatedly uses
the word “joinder” for the process of similarly situated workers opting
98
into a case.
A worker filing a “consent form . . . fulfill[s] the
99
statutory requirement of joinder,” the Court noted; its decision on
court supervision of worker notification was based on courts’
“managerial responsibility to oversee the joinder of additional
100
parties.”
Perhaps Hoffmann-La Roche used the word “joinder” in only a
general sense; but even more informatively, the case law
contemporaneous with the enactment of § 216(b) constantly
101
described § 216(b) opt-in as “joinder.” Pentland v. Dravo Corp., in
allowing a § 216(b) suit in 1945 summarized the early 1940s case law
102
on § 216(b): “all think in terms of permissive joinder of parties.”
Many of the cases that the court cited in Pentland did not actually use
103
the word “joinder,” but a survey of 1940s cases using the term
confirms that Pentland was right: many of the early cases viewed §
216(b) as a form of joinder, not as a form of class action:
• “The distinction between a true class action . . . [under]
97. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1934 & Supp. V 1938) (enacting § 216(b)), and
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1946 & Supp. V 1947) (amending § 216(b)), with FED. R. CIV. P.
23 (1966) (enacted 1966).
98. Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 168, 171, 173.
99. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 170–71 (emphasis added).
101. 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945).
102. Id. at 855 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 853 (discussing three groups of cases interpreting the nature of §
216(b)). Pentland cannot be faulted; no Westlaw search for the word “joinder” was
possible in 1946.
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Rule 23 . . . and a joinder of suits by employees ‘similarly
104
situated’ . . . is clear[] . . . .”
• “‘[This] is not a true class suit but is merely a unique
representative action permitted by Section 16(b) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which section provides for permissive
105
joinder of claims of other employees similarly situated.’”
• “Congress . . . by Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 . . . intended to permit a joinder of such suits by
106
employees ‘similarly situated’ . . . .”
• “[T]he intention of Congress [was] to authorize the joinder
of [wage] actions into one proceeding to prevent the
necessity of separate actions where the questions of law and
facts are the same and to, therefore, avoid the multiplicity
107
of suits.”
Case law through the 1970s continued to describe § 216(b) as a
108
“joinder” device. The view of § 216(b) as joinder apparently ended
only after the 1966 enactment of modern Rule 23; modern class
109
actions then became the predominant form of aggregate litigation.
This left the misimpression that § 216(b) collective actions are a
tighter version of class actions (because of the opt-in requirement)
rather than a liberalized version of joinder.
Plaintiffs joining claims under Rule 20 need not do anything like
what courts currently require of plaintiffs in a § 216(b) collective
action. Under Rule 20, plaintiffs suing together need not file any
104. Calabrese v. Chiumento, 3 F.R.D. 435, 437 (D.N.J. 1944) (emphasis added)
(denying dismissal).
105. Wright v. U.S. Rubber Co., 69 F. Supp. 621, 622–23 (S.D. Iowa 1946)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (denying dismissal).
106. Lofther v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 45 F. Supp. 986, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1941)
(emphasis added).
107. Winslow v. Nat’l Elec. Prods. Corp., 5 F.R.D. 126, 129 (W.D. Pa. 1946)
(emphasis added).
108. E.g., Locascio v. Teletype Corp., 74 F.R.D. 108, 111 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(observing that § 216(b) “authorizes joinder of plaintiffs who file a consent”); Berry
v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, No. 75-0711, 1976 WL 673, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 1976)
(recognizing § 216(b) as “merely a joinder provision”); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., No.
74-536, 1975 WL 195, at *4 (D.N.M. Apr. 23, 1975) (“The liberal joinder device
available under § 216 makes joinder simple.”).
109. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The
Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1851 n.98
(2008) (“From the late 1960s into the early 1980s, the federal courts were unwilling
to certify even relatively simple ‘single event/single situs’ mass accident torts as class
actions, but by the late 1980s they were certifying far more complicated and
multifaceted [classes]. . . . The next decade brought a growing number of such cases
into the national courts.”); Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What
Does It Mean for The Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
245, 287 (2008) (“[D]uring the 1970s and 1980s, federal courts interpreted . . . Rule
23(b)(3) to allow . . . large-scale class actions . . . .”).
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motion to allow joinder; they merely state all plaintiffs’ names
110
If more individuals
together on the caption of their complaint.
want to join after the suit commences, Rule 24(b)(1), in express
111
terms, requires them to file a motion to intervene as plaintiffs. The
text of § 216(b) requires no motion for opt-in, mandating only that
the new plaintiff “gives his consent in writing . . . and such consent is
112
filed in the court.”
More importantly, the standards under Rule 20 (joinder) and Rule
24 (intervention) are far more liberal than a class action-style sevenpart inquiry under Rule 23. Joinder requires only that the parties sue
about “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences,” and share just “any question of law or fact common to
113
all plaintiffs.”
Both requirements are permissive: only one
114
“common question” is required, even if plaintiffs differ in other
115
ways or seek different relief; and the “transaction or occurrence”
116
117
rule requires only “logically related events,” not the same events.
This liberal joinder standard dates to 1938, when the original Federal
118
Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated “the old formalistic approach”
of strict common law and code pleading in favor of broadly joining
119
multiple parties. Ever since, courts have granted joinder broadly to
120
serve “principles of trial convenience and efficiency.” Accordingly,
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1).
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B) (requiring the
same showing on an intervention motion; that a claim “shares with the main action a
common question of law or fact”).
114. See Carye v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 3, 8 (D. Mass. 2007)
(observing that Rule 20 does “not require the precise concurrence of all factual and
legal issues”); Puricelli v. CNA Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. 139, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)
(recognizing that commonality of one legal or factual issue is sufficient).
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(3) (providing that each party need not seek “all the
relief demanded [because] [t]he court may grant judgment to one or more”
separately).
116. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1653 (3d ed. 2001 & 2011 Supp.); see also Montgomery v.
STG Int’l, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 29, 35 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that the requirement
that “claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions
or occurrences” is met “if the claims are logically related”).
117. See Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting
that “[a]bsolute identity of all events is unnecessary”).
118. Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy
and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 815 (1989).
119. Id.; see John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 707, 707 (1976) (describing the public and judicial concern over repetitious
litigation and inconsistency if and when several suits are handled independently).
120. Vulcan Soc’y of Westchester Cnty. v. Fire Dep’t of City of White Plains, 82
F.R.D. 379, 384, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing “principles of trial convenience and
efficiency” to support denying misjoinder motion in suit alleging discriminatory
practices by fire departments); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383
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joinder extends to broad patterns, such as mass tort claims about
defects or practices affecting many, or discrimination claims flowing
121
from a company practice negatively impacting an entire group.
If Rule 20 requires so little to aggregate plaintiffs’ claims into one
suit, then how can § 216(b), a statute liberalizing joinder procedure,
be seen as requiring an evidentiary showing of greater commonality
than traditional joinder? The simple answer is that § 216(b) should
not be misinterpreted in that manner.
b.

Collective actions as parallel to original Rule 23(a)(3) “spurious”
opt-in classes requiring no “certification” motion

Courts incorrectly view § 216(b) collective actions as akin to
modern Rule 23 classes requiring judicial oversight. Rather, §216(b)
originated at a time when Rule 23 authorized no such oversight. The
modern Rule 23(b), enacted in 1966, establishes three types of class
actions, but the original Rule 23(a) from 1938 established a different
set of three types:
(a) If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, . . . one or more,
as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on
behalf of all, sue . . . when the character of the right sought to be
enforced [is:] . . .
(1) joint or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the
class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (describing the “weighty policies of judicial economy and
fairness” as strongly supporting a broadly construed joinder rule); Am. Ins. Co. v. St.
Jude Med., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 973, 980 (D. Minn. 2009) (determining that joining
insurance broker with insurer would promote a “‘just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination’ of all issues” (citations omitted)); In re DIRECTV, Inc., No. 02-5912,
2004 WL 2645971, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2004) (“The purpose of [Rule 20] is to
promote trial convenience and to expedite the final determination of disputes,
thereby preventing multiple lawsuits.”); Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 547,
549 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (“The permissive joinder doctrine is animated by several
policies, including the promotion of efficiency, convenience, consistency, and
fundamental fairness.” (citations omitted)).
121. See Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1334 (holding that “the district court abused its
discretion in severing the joined actions” because, though members suffered
different effects, sufficient evidence of pattern of conduct and common issue existed
regarding the defendant’s discriminatory policy); see also Puricelli v. CNA Ins. Co.,
185 F.R.D. 139, 141, 143–44 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (allowing joinder of former employees’
claims of age discrimination pattern); Diaz v. Allstate Ins. Grp., 185 F.R.D. 581, 589–
91 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding sufficient evidence of conspiracy to join insurer and
contractors on allegations that contractors, at insurer’s behest, collusively
overcharged or used inadequately cheap materials); Kuechle v. Bishop, 64 F.R.D.
179, 180–81 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (allowing joinder because defendant allegedly
scheming with others to defraud plaintiff raised common question of duties
defendant and conspirators owed).
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(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the
action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting
122
the several rights and a common relief is sought.

The two most common types paralleled the two main joinder
categories. If plaintiffs sued on shared “joint” interests under Rule
23(a)(1), the class automatically included all members—paralleling
123
Rule 19 mandatory joinder.
But if plaintiffs sued on “several”
interests, like distinct damages claims, Rule 23(a)(3) authorized what
124
covering only named
courts called a “spurious class action,”
125
plaintiffs and those who affirmatively opted in —paralleling Rule 20
126
Hence early
permissive joinder and § 216(b) collective actions.
giants of civil procedure such as Harry Kalven and James William
127
128
Moore, and early courts applying Rule 23(a)(3), expressed the
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1938).
123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a) (1939) (requiring that “[s]ubject to the provisions of
Rule 23 . . . persons having a joint interest shall be made parties” (emphasis added)).
124. See, e.g., Martinez v. Maverick Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No.
1, 219 F.2d 666, 672 (5th Cir. 1955) (noting that 23(a)(3) “is termed the spurious
class suit”); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 89 n.5 (7th Cir. 1941) (calling
23(a)(3) case “the type denominated a ‘spurious’ class suit” (citation omitted)).
125. See, e.g., Martinez, 219 F.2d at 672 (noting that a ruling under 23(a)(3) “does
not bind the class, but binds only those actually before the court”); Oppenheimer v.
F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944) (“[M]embers of the class who are
not joined . . . will not be affected . . . . [T]he decision will only be res judicata as to
the plaintiffs and the parties who have intervened.”); 3B JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.60, at 23-439 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that “under
original Rule 23 . . . in the spurious class action the judgment was conclusive only
upon the parties and privies to the proceeding”).
126. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (1939) (providing that “[a]ll persons may join in one
action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the
alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences” (emphasis added)).
127. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 703 (1941) (quoting 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2240 (1st ed. 1938)); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note
116, § 1752 (“[S]ubdivision [23(a)(3)] was merely a device for permissive joinder of
parties.”).
128. See, e.g., Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1966) (“Rule
23(a)(3) is merely a device for permissive joinder . . . .”); Martinez, 219 F.2d at 672
(noting that a 23(a)(3) class, “formed solely by the presence of a common question
of law or fact, is in reality a permissive joinder device”); Weeks, 125 F.2d at 89 n.5
(“[A]s the Federal Rules provide for permissive joinder they should also provide for
the counterpart, the [23(a)(3)] class action based on a common question of law or
fact.”); Hunter v. S. Indem. Underwriters, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 242, 243 (E.D. Ky. 1942)
(deeming 23(a)(3) “merely a ‘joinder device’” allowing those with “a common
interest in the questions of law or fact . . . to participate”).
A few courts disagreed, but only in viewing Rule 23(a)(3) more liberally—as
allowing automatic-inclusion, opt-out damages class actions—as under modern Rule
23(b)(3). E.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588–89 (10th
Cir. 1961) (surveying whether unnamed, non-opted-in plaintiffs can participate in
23(a)(3) spurious class).
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view that a spurious class suit “‘is a permissive joinder device.’”
Thus, Rule 23(a)(3) spurious class actions and § 216(b) collective
actions were contemporary 1938 creations that courts viewed as
similar: both aggregated damages claims for only those who opted in
and both were joinder liberalizations. Some courts expressly linked §
216(b) collective actions to Rule 23(a)(3) spurious class actions. For
example, in Pentland, one of the first appellate decisions on § 216(b),
130
the court “classif[ied] the proceeding as a spurious class suit” and
noted that the early district court § 216(b) cases also “classif[ied]
131
themselves as spurious class actions.”
Numerous other decisions,
mostly from the era when original Rule 23 was in place, similarly cast
§ 216(b) collective actions as “spurious” class actions analogous to
132
those of original Rule 23(a)(3).
The most critical point about § 216(b) and original Rule 23(a)(3)
is that neither required a “certification” motion of any kind. The text of
original Rule 23 required no such motion, and judicial practice at the
time was that a case filed as a spurious class action, or a § 216(b)
collective action, could proceed freely unless and until the defendant
filed a motion challenging it. Such a motion might be styled a
“motion to strike” the complaint’s class allegations or a “motion to
dismiss” the allegations. Either way, the defendant had to make the
motion and carry the burden. That was true in early § 216(b)
collective actions:
133
• McNichols v. Lennox Furnace Co. denied a motion to dismiss
the “allegation in the complaint that the employees in
whose behalf the action is maintained are ‘similarly
134
situated.’”
129. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 127, at 703 (citation omitted).
130. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945).
131. Id. at 855.
132. E.g., Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1977) (“A
FLSA class action under § 216(b) is ‘spurious,’ wherein the res judicata effect
extends only to the named parties, while in a ‘true’ Rule 23 class action, the res
judicata effect of a judgment extends to the entire class.” (citations omitted)),
abrogated by Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989); Kainz v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 1952) (“[S]purious class actions . .
. have been approved where separate employees join to recover compensation under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.”); McComb v. Frank Scerbo & Sons, Inc., 177 F.2d 137,
140 (2d Cir. 1949) (noting that 1947 enactment of opt-in rule “limited the original
[§ 216(b)] provision for a representative or class action—of the so-called ‘spurious’
form, not binding upon nonappearing parties—to require a definite consent in
writing . . . before [one] could be thus represented” (citing Pentland, 152 F.2d at
851)); Kam Koon Wan v. E. E. Black, Ltd., 75 F. Supp. 553, 565 (D. Haw. 1948)
(discussing “a spurious class action such as this brought under § 216 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act”).
133. 7 F.R.D. 40 (N.D.N.Y. 1947).
134. Id. at 42 (explaining that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient
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• Pentland v. Dravo Corp. reversed the grant of a motion “for
judgment on the pleadings” against plaintiff’s lawsuit,
seeking to include others similarly situated who were not yet
135
plaintiffs.
136
• Kam Koon Wan v. E. E. Black, Ltd. granted the defendant’s
motion for partial summary judgment, but without
questioning the propriety of adjudicating the claims of
“[t]he 313 persons similarly situated in whose behalf the
original plaintiff also sued” and who under § 216(b)
137
“sought to and succeeded in becoming parties plaintiff.”
In an identical manner, in the larger body of spurious class action
case law, it was up to the defendant to move to dismiss or to strike the
class allegations:
138
• In Lipsett v. United States, the defendant filed a “motion to
strike the allegations of a class action,” which the district
court had granted before the Second Circuit reversed the
139
dismissal.
140
• In Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., the Third Circuit approved
the securities class action when ruling on a motion to
141
dismiss.
142
• In Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., the defendant’s motion to
dismiss targeted the class allegations and joinder of
plaintiffs, with defendant moving only “that the class action
be dismissed . . . [and] other plaintiffs named in the
143
complaint be dropped.”
In none of these cases did any court question the procedural
posture of leaving the defendant to file a motion challenging the
propriety of a class action.
The original Rule 23 drew criticism for letting plaintiffs sue without
judicial scrutiny of whether class actions were proper. Wright and
Miller advocated judicial oversight: “the court always should be free
to strike . . . references to the representation of the absent persons,
because they “detail the nature of the work performed at the defendant’s place of
business by the employees, and [also] specific recurring instances where . . .
employees are required to perform services for which they have not been
compensated”).
135. Pentland, 152 F.2d at 852.
136. 75 F. Supp. 553 (D. Haw. 1948).
137. Id. at 564.
138. 359 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1966).
139. Id. at 958.
140. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
141. Id. at 38, 49–50.
142. 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952).
143. Id. at 739.
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and confine the litigation to those actually present, when the
individual questions loom so large that convenient judicial
144
administration will not be served by . . . a class action.” Yet Wright
and Miller noted the lack of original Rule 23 authority for such
oversight: “It is not clear that this course could be followed in a
145
federal court under the original rule.”
Similarly, in Lipsett, one of
the last appellate class action decisions under original Rule 23, the
court noted there was less rationale for judicial supervision of spurious
class actions because they bind only those who opt in, not absent class
146
members unaware of the case.
In sum, § 216(b) collective actions originated at a time when Rule
23 did not authorize the judicial oversight that it does today, and the
similar Rule 23(a)(3) spurious class actions were particularly free of
oversight. Thus, the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 creating judicial
oversight of true automatic-inclusion class actions does not grant
authority for judicial oversight of opt-in § 216(b) actions.
3.

How the error started: few precedents until a 1990s conflation of
approving “notice” and approving collective actions themselves
If collective action “certification” was a mistake from the start,
whose bad idea was it? What case was the “patient zero,” infecting
later courts with this now-pandemic error? Often there is no clear
“first” case in a line of authority: several contemporaneous cases may
hold similarly; or the first case may not be the most influential. But
here, a clear answer exists.
For several decades after the enactment of § 216(b), there
generally were no certification motions; the only collective action
certification inquiries seem to be erroneous conflations of Rule 23
and § 216(b) occurring when plaintiffs pled both. Some plaintiffs
just got it wrong, seeking a Rule 23 class for a § 216(b)-covered claim,
147
and the court failed to correct the error. In Lusardi v. Xerox Corp.,
the plaintiffs sued “under the ADEA only on behalf of a Rule 23
148
The court required plaintiffs to replace Rule 23 with §
class.”
216(b) in the complaint, but it still ruled on “certification” of the §
216(b) collective action after plaintiffs filed a certification motion:
144. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 116, § 1752.
145. Id.
146. Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1966); see Pirrone v. N.
Hotel Assocs., 108 F.R.D. 78, 82 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“[B]ecause potential plaintiffs who
do not opt in to an FLSA class action will not be bound by the court’s judgment, due
process does not require notice to potential plaintiffs.”).
147. 99 F.R.D. 89 (D.N.J. 1983).
148. Id. at 93 n.7.
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“Plaintiffs . . . seek certification under . . . [§ 216(b)] as an alternative
to Rule 23. . . . [U]nder this authority a class action can go
149
forward.”
Other § 216(b) “certification” inquiries arose in “hybrid” actions
when plaintiffs brought one § 216(b)-covered claim (e.g., EPA wage
discrimination) and another to which Rule 23 applied (e.g., Title VII
gender discrimination). A hybrid could be a Rule 23 class action for
one claim (e.g., Title VII) and a § 216(b) collective action opt-in
150
action for the other (e.g., EPA), but some courts improperly
required “certification” for both. For example, in Hubbard v.
151
152
Rubbermaid, Inc., an EPA and Title VII hybrid, the court declared
it would decide the propriety of a § 216(b) EPA collective action (on
the EPA claim) on the same “certification motion” plaintiffs filed for
the Rule 23 Title VII class: “[On] plaintiff’s ability to maintain a class
action . . . under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)[,] [t]he court will reach these
153
questions when it considers the pending class certification motion.”
Despite oddities like Lusardi and Hubbard, § 216(b) “certification”
inquiries were rarities for decades. A search for § 216(b) certification
154
motions is telling : of 836 cases, only 12 were before 1990, but there
were 29 cases in the 1990s and 795 cases since 2000. This sharp
uptick only partly reflects the increased number of FLSA suits, which
155
increased 348% from 1997 to 2007 for reasons that “includ[e]
economic pressures [and] the increased number of plaintiffs’
156
But the 1990s’ spike in certification
[employment] lawyers.”
inquiries also reflects the Supreme Court’s creation in Hoffmann-La
Roche of a judicial role in supervising § 216(b) “notice.” In 1995, the
Fifth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to accept the
149. Id. at 93.
150. E.g., Godfrey v. Chelan Cnty. PUD, No. CV-06-00332, 2007 WL 2327582, at
*2, *4 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2007) (allowing simultaneous Rule 23 class action for
state-law wage claims and § 216(b) collective action for FLSA wage claims);
Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).
151. 436 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1977).
152. Id. at 1186.
153. Id. at 1186 n.1.
154. The search on Westlaw, last updated January 18, 2012, had the following
parameters: ((motion mov!) /s (class collective) /s certif! ) /p ( “216(b)” “626(b)”
(flsa /s “16(b)”)).
155. See James C. Duff, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2007 Annual
Report of the Director, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 150 (2007),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2007/front/JudicialB
usinespdfversion.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (tabulating 7310 FLSA suits in
2007); Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 1997
Annual Report of the Director, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 133 (1997),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/1997/appendices/c2asep97.pdf
(last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (tabulating 1633 FLSA suits in 1997).
156. Ruan, supra note 44, at 735.
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Court’s invitation with its decision in Mooney v. Aramco Services Co.,
which upheld, and delineated, a use of the now-standard two-step
certification approach premised on a need for a ruling on HoffmannLa Roche notice:
The first determination is made at the so-called “notice stage” . . .
[as to] whether notice of the action should be given to potential
class members. . . . [T]his determination is made using a fairly
lenient standard, and typically results in “conditional
certification” . . . [and] putative class members [being] given
notice . . . to “opt-in.” . . . The second determination is typically
precipitated by a [defense] motion for “decertification” . . . after
158
discovery is largely complete.

Mooney is really the first precedent for the two-stage certification
process, but it cited only two district court decisions as support, both
159
of which were weak precedents. One spoke of certification only at
160
the moment of “notice,” not as two stages. The other did use a twostage analysis but had especially little precedential value due to a
tortured procedural history: different judges had the case at each
“stage,” and the opinion adopting a two-stage process was reversed on
161
other grounds.
Oddly, Mooney is the leading precedent for a two-stage approach it
“specifically [did] not endorse”: “[T]he ‘opt-in’ plaintiffs were not
similarly situated. In so holding we specifically do not endorse the
methodology employed by the district court, and do not sanction any
162
particular methodology.”
The two other precedents for applying
157. 54 F.3d 1207 (5th Cir. 1995).
158. Id. at 1213–14.
159. See Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 392, 412 (D.N.J. 1988)
(speaking of certification only at the moment of “notice,” not as two distinct stages),
aff’d, 862 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1988), aff’d, 493 U.S. 165 (1989); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp.,
118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987) (applying originally a two-stage process; however, the
opinion adopting that process was reversed on other grounds), mandamus granted sub
nom. Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062 (3d Cir. 1988), modified sub nom. Lusardi v.
Xerox Corp., 122 F.R.D. 463 (D.N.J. 1988); see also Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1213 & n.6
(finding both Sperling and Lusardi to be examples of two-stage analysis).
160. Sperling, 118 F.R.D. at 412.
161. Lusardi, 118 F.R.D. 351. Mooney stated that Lusardi used the “two-step
analysis.” Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1213. However, in Lusardi, different district judges
handled each “stage,” and the declaration of a two-stage process came only in the
second judge’s opinion—leaving unclear whether the analysis was purposely “twostage” or simply a second judge reversing the first. Lusardi, 118 F.R.D. at 353 (Judge
Lechner’s decertification decision, noting that Judge Stern’s certification decision
was in 1983). Also, the Lusardi decertification decision declaring a two-stage process
was reversed and remanded on other grounds. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062. On remand,
the district court simply held in a brief decision that “this case is not suitable for class
treatment” because of fact differences among plaintiffs, without further discussion of
a two-stage inquiry. Lusardi, 122 F.R.D. at 467.
162. Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1216.
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the two-stage approach, the Tenth Circuit’s Hipp v. Liberty National
163
Life Insurance Co. and the Eleventh Circuit’s Thiessen v. General
164
Electric Capital Corp., simply follow Mooney: Hipp cited only Mooney as
165
166
circuit authority; and Thiessen subsequently cited Mooney and Hipp.
167
168
169
170
171
District courts in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and
172
Ninth Circuits cite Mooney, and sometimes Hipp and Theissen too,
because of the lack of controlling appellate decisions in those
circuits.
Notably, the Eleventh Circuit got its analysis partly right before
173
getting it wrong. In Grayson v. K Mart Corp., the court held that
“section 216(b)’s ‘similarly situated’ requirement is less stringent
174
than that for joinder under Rule 20(a).” Yet the court still required
a certification motion where “plaintiffs bear the burden of
demonstrating a ‘reasonable basis’ for their claim [through] . . .
175
detailed allegations supported by affidavits.” In Anderson v. Cagle’s,
163. 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
164. 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001).
165. Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218–19 (“The two-tiered approach [discussed in Mooney] . .
. appears to be an effective tool for district courts to use in managing these often
complex cases, and we suggest that district courts in this circuit adopt it . . . .”).
166. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102–03, 1105 (reasoning that “[a]rguably, the ad hoc
approach is the best,” and other courts’ Rule 23-based analyses were incorrect
because in § 216(b) cases, “Congress clearly chose not to have the Rule 23 standards
apply[,] . . . instead adopt[ing] the ‘similarly situated’ standard”).
167. See, e.g., Kane v. Gage Merch. Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214 (D. Mass.
2001) (citing Mooney as primary authority supporting its decision to “apply the ‘twostep’ method”).
168. See, e.g., Scott v. Aetna Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 261, 264 (D. Conn. 2002)
(citing Mooney as primary authority and sole circuit-level authority for the proposition
that “[c]ourts utilize a two-step approach to certifying collective actions under the
FLSA”).
169. See, e.g., Felix De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 (E.D.
Pa. 2001) (citing Mooney as primary authority and sole circuit authority for holding
that in “FLSA representative actions, a two tier method for the burden of proving
similarly situated plaintiffs has developed”).
170. See, e.g., Murton v. Measurecomp, LLC, No. 07-3127, 2008 WL 5725631, at *2
(N.D. Ohio June 9, 2008) (citing Mooney, Thiessen, and Hipp in observing that
“[a]lthough the Sixth Circuit has not addressed the procedure for certifying a
collective action under the FLSA, the clearly prevailing approach involves a two-stage
process”).
171. See, e.g., Koren v. SUPERVALU, Inc., No. 00-1479, 2003 WL 1572002, at *15
(D. Minn. Mar. 14, 2003) (citing Mooney as primary authority and sole circuit
authority for the proposition that courts conduct a two-stage inquiry of “‘conditional
certification’” and “factual determination;” if plaintiffs “are not similarly situated, the
district court decertifies the class”).
172. See, e.g., Wynn v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1082 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (noting that “it appears the majority of courts prefer the ad hoc, two-tiered
approach, as described in Mooney,” and also citing Hipp as authority for applying the
two-tiered approach).
173. 79 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 1996).
174. Id. at 1096.
175. Id. at 1097.
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176

Inc., however, the Eleventh Circuit later joined the Tenth Circuit in
rejecting a liberal joinder standard:
[T]he lenient standard we adopted in [] Grayson [applies to] a
certification decision early in the litigation before discovery . . . .
The “similarly situated” standard at the second stage is less
“lenient” than at the first, as is the plaintiffs’ burden . . . . [T]he
“similarly situated” standard at the second stage [is] “stricter” than
that applied at the first stage . . . . [F]actors courts consider
includ[e] “(1) disparate factual and employment settings of the
individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to
defendant[s] . . . individual to each plaintiff; [and] (3) fairness and
procedural considerations.” . . . [S]imilarities . . . must extend
177
“beyond the mere facts of job duties and pay provisions.”

The premise of the two-stage process, as elaborated by Mooney and
repeated frequently since, is plausible enough: to order Hoffmann-La
Roche notice, a court must deem the collective action proper; but that
“notice stage” comes early in the case, so a court should revisit
certification later, after discovery supports or undercuts the “similarly
situated” allegations. Yet, this logic alone is not enough because
courts wield only those powers granted by statute or by rule. As
detailed above, given that § 216(b) was a liberalization of basic joinder,
courts cannot disallow joinder of plaintiffs by requiring an evidentiary
178
motion meeting a heightened joinder standard.
While courts
properly supervise “notice,” that simple exercise of Rule 83 case
management power does not authorize courts to reject an entire
collective action. Thus, the only proper scrutiny a collective action
faces is a Rule 12 dismissal or Rule 21 misjoinder motion, to either of
which only the basic joinder requirement of a single common issue
would apply.
4.

Less need for judicial scrutiny under § 216(b) than Rule 23: claims
are presumptively similar, and opt-in lessens “agency” concern
a.

The presumptively similar nature of § 216(b) claims lessens the need
for judicial scrutiny of commonality

The typical § 216(b) collective action is limited in subject-matter
scope because it seeks unpaid wages by workers at the same
179
employer.
While § 216(b) currently includes two other types of
176.
177.
178.
179.
2008)

488 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 952–53 (citations omitted).
See supra Part II.A.2.a.
See, e.g., Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.
(discussing an FLSA suit for unpaid overtime wages among “[a]n opt-in class
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claims—age discrimination and gender equal pay claims—§ 216(b) as
enacted applied only to wage claims; the other two were added in the
1960s, and wage claims “are by far the most common” and most
180
significant type of § 216(b) action. Unlike Rule 23, which can apply
to anything from mass tort to racism to bank fraud, § 216(b) applies
only to a narrow range of subject matter, decreasing the odds that
workers filing claims together are not sufficiently “similarly situated.”
Accordingly, § 216(b) is a legislative determination that courts
presumptively should allow aggregation into one lawsuit of claims
filed under the same statute against the same employer.
Occasionally, workers’ § 216(b) claims may vary too widely for a
collective action. While the typical § 216(b) collective action alleges
that a certain pay practice affected all workers in a certain job
181
category, a lawsuit conceivably could claim an adventurously wide
array of FLSA violations. An early § 216(b) opinion gave a dated
example of claims that might vary too much: “the claims of a
plumber or a window washer or a scrub woman, each based on a
separate contract of employment, might involve differing questions of
182
law and of fact.”
More modern examples of overly varied claims
183
include delivery workers’ claims of sub-minimum wages, store
salespeople’s claims that managers “manipulate employee time cards
so as to avoid paying for wages earned during rest breaks or
184
overtime,” and white-collar human resources or financial planning
officers’ claims of being denied overtime under the FLSA
185
administrative employee exemption.
Less conceivably, wage
plaintiffs might file jointly with age discrimination plaintiffs, though
no such bizarre efforts are known to have ever occurred.
The “similarly situated” requirement allows for denial of collective
action status when plaintiffs’ claims vary too widely; however, as
detailed above, the possibility of an overly broad § 216(b) action does
of 1,424 store managers” employed by the same discount retail store); Archuleta v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 543 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008) (considering an FLSA
suit filed by a class of pharmacists all employed by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.).
180. Dorris supra note 8, at 1251.
181. See, e.g., Liu v. Jen Chu Fashion Corp., No. 00 Civ.4221 RJH AJP, 2004 WL
33412, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2004) (claiming that both hourly workers and piece
workers worked overtime without receiving overtime pay); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s
Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184, 190–91 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (alleging that three
supermarket corporations misclassified all of their delivery workers).
182. Lofther v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 45 F. Supp. 986, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1941).
183. See Ansoumana, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 186 (distinguishing between delivery
workers who make deliveries on foot and delivery workers who utilize different
means).
184. Alix v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 868 N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (App. Div. 2008).
185. Deng v. Searchforce, Inc., No. 11-00254, 2011 WL 940828, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 17, 2011).
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not justify Rule 23-style judicial scrutiny that courts are not
authorized to undertake and that Congress never envisioned as a part
of § 216(b) adjudication. Rather, as detailed in Part III below, courts
can redress too-broad § 216(b) actions on defense motions arguing
misjoinder or seeking to dismiss collective action allegations.
b.

Lack of agency problems because § 216(b) requires opt-in, not
automatic inclusion

Ultimately, the key question is whether § 216(b) actions feature the
“principal-agent problem” that justifies close judicial scrutiny of class
actions: that class counsel, with the named plaintiffs’ collusion or
indifference, can sell out or neglect the interests of the masses of
186
unnamed class members. Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller give
a classic summary of the agency problem:
[P]laintiffs’ class . . . attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs
who bear a substantial amount of the litigation risk and exercise
nearly plenary control over all important decisions in the lawsuit.
The absence of client monitoring raises the specter that the
entrepreneurial attorney will serve her own interest at the expense
of the client. . . .
[E]xisting regulations are extraordinarily
187
ineffective at aligning the interests of attorney and client . . . .

Such agency problems may arise innocently, as class members defer
to counsel for various reasons: counsel’s greater expertise and
cultivation of the client relationship; named plaintiffs’ receipt of
court-authorized
“incentive
payments”
making
them
188
disproportionately pleased with the case outcome; and the disparity
189
between counsel’s heavy stake and each member’s modest stake.
Less innocently, because of unlawful “kickbacks” from attorneys,

186. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 15, at 609.
187. Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 3; see Coffee, supra note 17, at 292 (asserting
that class actions “confer[] vast discretion on plaintiffs’ attorneys,” “creating
principal-agent problems that remain intractable despite repeated efforts by
Congress and the courts to curb highly visible abuses”); Alexandra Lahav,
Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 65 (2003)
(criticizing class actions as “governed by [plaintiffs’] attorneys with limited judicial
oversight”); cf. Beisner et al., supra note 17, at 1451 (noting plaintiff attorneys’
responses to charges that they take on class actions only to reap large profits).
188. See Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of Incentive
Payments to Named Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 395, 411–25 (2006) (discussing why incentive payments are appropriate
for named plaintiffs based on, among other considerations, the disproportionate
amount of risk they assume compared to unnamed members of a class).
189. See Lahav, supra note 187, at 126 (asserting that “direct and active class
member participation” in class actions seeking small per-person recoveries is
infeasible because “participation is too expensive in relation to the interests at
stake”).
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named plaintiffs may allow high legal fees such as those paid by the
now-notorious, but once well-respected, plaintiff-side class action firm
190
Milberg Weiss.
Rule 23 has always granted judges unusual powers to police the
decisions of class members and attorneys on matters courts normally
have no authority to scrutinize. Even original Rule 23’s modest
191
requirements included judicial scrutiny of settlements; the far
stricter modern Rule 23 requires plaintiffs to file a class certification
motion proving that: (1) their class is numerous enough to make
joinder impractical; (2) members’ claims are similar enough; and (3)
192
class counsel are sufficiently qualified.
Academics persuaded of
agency problems, though, propose even more class action
restrictions:
193
• using opt-in for Rule 23 classes, because opt-in cases
create “competition” as multiple firms “litigate opt-in
194
class[es] . . . with the same defendants” and are “less likely
195
to overwhelm defendants”;
• creating “guardians ad litem to represent the interest[s]” of
small-claims class members and to assure scrutiny of
196
settlements and fees;
• stressing class member “exit” rights (i.e., opt-out) more
than “voice” rights (i.e., lead plaintiffs’ influence), because
exit “encourage[s] a competition that directly benefits the
class member,” while “voice . . . cause[s] counsel to curry
197
favor with a limited number” of plaintiffs;
• requiring more detailed class disclosures so members can
198
police counsel better as to settlements —or, in the view of
other critics, requiring less disclosure because its cost risks
190. See Jonathan D. Glater, Class-Action Lawyer Given a 30-Month Prison Term for
Hiding Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at C3 (reporting that a federal district
judge sentenced Melvyn I. Weiss to 30 months in prison, fined him $250,000, and
ordered him to pay $9.8 million in forfeitures following Weiss’s conviction for
covering up illegal plaintiff kickbacks).
191. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (1938) (“A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court.”).
192. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
193. See, e.g., John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1419, 1447 (2003) (advocating for Rule 23 opt-in due to the “public character of
adjudication as opposed to settlement”).
194. Coffee, supra note 17, at 338.
195. Id. at 344.
196. Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 4; see Lahav, supra note 187, at 128
(proposing judicial appointment of a “‘devil’s advocate’” to scrutinize settlements
otherwise lacking adversarial scrutiny).
197. Coffee, supra note 17, at 328–29.
198. Lahav, supra note 187, at 123.
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the competing agency problem of under-incentivizing
199
attorneys; and
• holding court-run “auction[s] for plaintiffs’ claims, under
which attorneys (and others) could bid for the right to
bring the litigation and gain the benefits,” in order to
200
create a more competitive market for serving classes.
Others see agency cost fears as overblown or insufficient to justify
201
restrictions that can stifle reform-minded class actions.
Nonetheless, arguments for restricting class actions have the upper
hand, with politicians blasting class action lawyers for betraying their
202
203
clients, and Congress continuing to enact restrictions.
In two critical ways, however, § 216(b) collective actions lack the
key agency concerns that justify judicial scrutiny of Rule 23 class
actions. First, under § 216(b), only those who affirmatively opt in are
participants; only opt-ins are bound by any judgment, are party to any
settlement, or otherwise have rights at stake in the decisions of class
204
counsel. Second, § 216(b) opt-ins are actual “party plaintiff[s],” not
205
just unnamed class members.
Not only must each potential
plaintiff individually decide to join a collective action, but typically
206
each must personally participate in discovery. In Krueger v. New York

199. See Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 4 (“The high cost of notifying absent
class members when potential recovery is very small deters entrepreneurial attorneys
from bringing meritorious suits. Thus, the rule harms, rather than protects, absent
class members.”).
200. Id. at 6.
201. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers
Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 331–32 (defending controversial “fraud-on-themarket class-action lawsuit[s]” by arguing that “[d]espite the weakness of its
compensatory justification, the cause of action serves important deterrence functions
that are unlikely to be equally well performed by public enforcement”); Gilles &
Friedman, supra note 17, at 104–05 (“Where the conventional wisdom has gone
wrong, however, is in condemning [the conflict between class action plaintiffs’
lawyers’ profits and their clients’ interests] as a bad thing and proposing reforms for
class action practice designed to correct this conflict by increasing the compensation
of absent class members.”); Ruan, supra note 188, at 421–22 (defending incentive
payments to named plaintiffs, at least in public interest litigation, where collusion
risk is lower while benefit of litigation is higher).
202. See SEN. ORRIN HATCH, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2003, S. REP. NO.
108-123, at 32 (2003) (“Abusive class action settlements in which plaintiffs receive
promotional coupons or other nominal damages while class counsel receive large
fees are all too commonplace.”).
203. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006)) (codifying a “consumer class action bill of rights” and
expanding federal diversity jurisdiction to take many class actions out of state courts,
based on concerns with forum-shopping, unscrupulous class action attorneys, and socalled professional plaintiffs).
204. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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Telephone Co., for example, the court noted that, because “each” of
the 156 opt-in plaintiffs “freely chose[] to participate and . . . ha[d]
relevant information,” each had to participate in written discovery
(including interrogatory questions and document demands), and
208
one-quarter of them had to give deposition testimony. Where there
are fewer than one hundred plaintiffs, courts have allowed written
209
discovery and depositions of each individual opt-in plaintiff.
Indeed, on certification motions, plaintiffs regularly offer sworn
210
testimony from opt-ins on their individual claims.
Because § 216(b) collective actions litigate the rights of only
named plaintiffs and those who affirmatively opt in, there simply are
no § 216(b) class members unknown to the court, unaware of the
case, or unwilling to participate. To be sure, in a large collective
action, some of the hundreds or thousands of opt-ins might pay little
more attention than the average Rule 23 class member. But the
absent-plaintiff problem in Rule 23 classes occurs when a plaintiff is
unaware of the case or, though nominally aware, too uninformed to
make a decision about participation. In contrast, “opt-in class
members, having elected to participate, are unlikely to be so
211
indifferent” as unnamed Rule 23 class members because, among
other things, these opt-in plaintiffs typically face individualized
discovery.
A § 216(b) opt-in plaintiff who pays little attention to the case is no
different from a plaintiff in a one-party lawsuit who defers to counsel
rather than actively participating in the litigation process. Federal

207. 163 F.R.D. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
208. Id. at 449 (requiring 39 of the 156 plaintiffs to appear for depositions).
209. See, e.g., Rosen v. Reckitt & Colman Inc., No. 91 Civ. 1675, 1994 WL 652534,
at *1–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1994) (allowing defendants to demand documents and
depositions from each member of a fifty-plaintiff ADEA collective action); Kaas v.
Pratt & Whitney, No 89-8343, 1991 WL 158943, at *1, *3–5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 1991)
(allowing interrogatories, document demands, and depositions from each opt-in
plaintiff in an approximately one hundred-member ADEA collective action).
210. See, e.g., Declaration of Justin M. Swartz in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Conditional Certification & Court-Authorized Notice Pursuant to Section 216(b) of
the FLSA at 5, 7, Cruz v. Hook-Superx, LLC, No. 09-7717, 2010 WL 3069558
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2009) (listing declarations of seven opt-in plaintiffs); Declaration of
Anjana Samant in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification &
Court-Authorized Notice Pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA at 5, Mohney v.
Shelly’s Prime Steak, Stone Crab & Oyster Bar, No. 06-4270, 2008 WL 7863650
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2007) (attaching excerpts of depositions of two opt-in plaintiffs);
Declaration of Justin M. Swartz in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional
Certification as an FLSA Collective Action & for Court-Authorized Notice Pursuant
to Section 216(b) of the FLSA at 2–6, Hens v. ClientLogic Operating Corp., No. 0500381, 2006 WL 2795620 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2005) (listing declarations of forty-nine
opt-in plaintiffs).
211. Coffee, supra note 17, at 333.
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rules do not require personal participation by plaintiffs, nor do they
protect those who remain uninformed; only Rule 23 so protects, and
it only protects unnamed class members at the risk of having their
rights abrogated in lawsuits they neither filed nor affirmatively joined.
When claims are aggregated only by affirmative opt-in, rather than
by automatic inclusion in a class action, “[t]here is really no question
212
of adequacy of representation.” In Lipsett v. United States, the court
explained that more judicial scrutiny is unnecessary when a class
includes only those who affirmatively opt into the case:
[B]ecause Rule 23(a)(3) is merely a device for permissive joinder,
there should be little, if any, inquiry into whether the class is of
appropriate size . . . . Unlike the “true” class action, . . . non-party
members are not bound by the judgment . . . . [I]n fact there is no
213
representation at all, of non-party members.

At least one § 216(b) decision has made the same point. The
214
district court in Pirrone v. North Hotel Associates addressed a narrower
issue, but it held “notice to potential plaintiffs” unnecessary based on
the same rationale that opt-in actions pose no threat to class
members who do not affirmatively join: “because potential plaintiffs
who do not opt into an FLSA class action will not be bound by the
court’s judgment, due process does not require notice to potential
215
plaintiffs.”
Thus, courts and commentators who think that Rule 23 safeguards
apply to § 216(b) collective actions are missing a key distinction: §
216(b) actions do not feature the agency problem of class counsel
selling out unaware members, which is the rationale for such
safeguards in class actions. Agency problems certainly may exist to
some degree in a § 216(b) case when clients have low stakes, low
education, or unethical attorneys, but such problems, which are
always possible in individual and multi-party litigation alike, can and
should be redressed by existing ethics and court rules, as detailed
216
below.
B. Serious Consequences of the Erroneous Certification Motion Process
It is no mere ministerial error of procedure when, on a § 216(b)
collective action, courts require a collective action “certification”
motion and apply a heightened Rule 23 analysis rather than a simple
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1966).
Id.
108 F.R.D. 78 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Id. at 82.
See infra Part III.B.3.
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joinder inquiry.
These stricter requirements have serious
consequences for collective actions. Without rehashing the entire
debate over whether procedure should, or even can, be kept separate
217
from claim substance or merits, the § 216(b) collective action
procedure is a procedural device predominantly for FLSA minimum
and overtime wage rights. Therefore, courts’ procedural errors are
inextricably linked with the wage rights they prevent from being
vindicated.
1.

The high stakes: widespread, high-dollar wage violations
Studies and reported cases alike show workers are routinely denied
218
statutory workplace rights, especially low-wage workers’ wage rights.
219
220
221
Workers in construction, garment factories, nursing homes,
222
223
224
agriculture, poultry processing, and restaurants have suffered
217. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1282–83 (2002) (arguing that depicting “a sharp divide
between procedure and substance . . . ignores decades of judicial frustration
grappling with the procedure/substance dichotomy”); Robert M. Cover, For James
Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732–33 (1975)
(disputing the view “that the procedural needs of a complex antitrust action . . . and
an environmental class action . . . are sufficiently identical to be usefully
encompassed in a single set of [procedural] rules which makes virtually no
distinctions [between them]”); Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal
but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE
L.J. 889, 918 (2009) (“Accurate cost-benefit analysis of the value of evidence is
impossible without considering case merits, because the benefit of evidence (helping
a plaintiff prove a case) is highest when the plaintiff’s claim has enough merit that
the factfinder is permitted, but not compelled, to rule for the plaintiff.”).
218. See Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of
Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, UNPROTECTEDWORKERS.ORG, 9 (2009),
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1
(explaining that the authors have found numerous violations of workplace laws and
warning that existing protections are not meeting the needs of workers in low-wage
industries).
219. See Strouse v. J. Kinson Cook, Inc., 634 F.2d 883, 884–86 (5th Cir. Unit B
1981) (per curiam) (granting construction workers attorneys’ fees on winning FLSA
claims); Marroquin v. Canales, 236 F.R.D. 257, 258, 262 (D. Md. 2006) (certifying
FLSA action by day laborers denied daily wages for cleaning Hurricane Katrina
debris).
220. See, e.g., Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192–93
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (precluding discovery of immigration status of workers seeking
unpaid wages).
221. See, e.g., Hamelin v. Faxton-St. Luke’s Healthcare, No. 6:08-CV-1219, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9793, at *32–34 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009) (certifying FLSA action by
health care employees claiming compulsion to work during unpaid breaks).
222. See, e.g., Reich v. Tiller Helicopter Servs., Inc., 8 F.3d 1018, 1022, 1024–27
(5th Cir. 1993) (discussing history and scope of FLSA agricultural exemption).
223. See, e.g., Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 499, 502–03, 528 (D.
Md. 2009) (entering judgment on poultry processing plant workers’ claim of unpaid
work-time required to don and doff personal protective equipment), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 650 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2011).
224. See, e.g., Long John Silver’s Rests., Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345, 347, 353–54 (4th
Cir. 2008) (declining to vacate arbitration award for employees not paid overtime
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systematic unlawful wage losses. One survey of workers in low-wage
225
industries in the three largest United States cities found 26% were
paid below minimum wage, and over 75% were not paid overtime
226
due the previous week. The magnitude of violations shown by that
study is substantial: the workers lost, and the employers illegally
227
retained, an average of $56.4 million dollars per week.
Another
study reports similar findings: annually, “[b]illions of dollars in
228
wages are being illegally stolen from millions of workers.” In short,
workers who can ill-afford wage loss are losing a great deal. As
detailed below, such wage violations, primarily affecting low-wage
workers, go without remedy when courts disallow collective actions.
2.

Aggregate litigation is the sole feasible enforcement mechanism for masses
of individually small claims
Aggregating claims can be the only realistic redress for multiple
claims too small for individual litigation, as the Supreme Court has
229
Employment claims typically
noted repeatedly in Rule 23 cases.
230
seek modest individual damages, especially wage claims alleging
wages).
225. See Bernhardt et al., supra note 218, at 2, 4 (explaining that the survey of 4387
workers in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City captured violations often going
underreported in a variety of low-wage jobs, including in the garment industry,
domestic work, restaurants, and retail).
226. Id. at 21, 33.
227. Id. at 50.
228. KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA 6 (2009).
229. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“[Class
actions] overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action . . . by aggregating the relatively paltry potential
recoveries into something worth . . . [the] labor.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Class actions . . . permit
the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.”);
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not
economically feasible to obtain relief within . . . a multiplicity of small individual suits
for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may
employ the class action device.”); see also ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 24:64 (4th ed. 2002) (noting that class actions produce
larger fee awards by creating substantial recovery funds).
230. Even employment discrimination claims, typically about terminations from
five-figure jobs rather than just wage underpayments, yield modest recoveries. See
Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of
Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 705–06
(explaining that a study using statistics from the year 2001 showed that of the small
fraction (3.8%) of race-based discrimination cases proceeding to trial verdicts,
plaintiffs lost 61.9%; when they won, the median verdict was just $130,500); see also
Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment
Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 144 & n.134 (2007) (observing
that employment discrimination settlements, though far more common than trials,
yield even less—a median of $30,000, well below the personal injury case median
($181,500)).
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that hundreds or thousands of individuals were underpaid a small
231
The modest damages make most wage claims
amount per hour.
232
prohibitively costly to prosecute individually : an individual case
worth a few thousand dollars is not worth the attorney time necessary
233
for the required discovery and motions; it hardly is even worth the
thousands of dollars in out-of-pocket costs for witness transcripts
234
alone.
A chance at statutory attorneys’ fees provides insufficient
incentive in individual cases, as the typically modest settlement
amounts do not leave much for fees and courts routinely reduce even
235
prevailing attorneys’ fees.
Moreover, individual litigation requires one plaintiff to shoulder all
litigation costs and risks herself. This includes not only out-of-pocket
231. See, e.g., Phelps v. 3PD, Inc., 261 F.R.D. 548, 563 (D. Or. 2009) (recognizing
superiority of class actions in employment cases due to typically small size of
individual awards); Chase v. AIMCO Props., L.P., 374 F. Supp. 2d 196, 198 (D.D.C.
2005) (“[I]ndividual wage and hour claims might be too small in dollar terms to
support a litigation effort . . . .”); Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 P.3d
194, 209 (Cal. 2004) (“[T]he class suit . . . provides small [overtime] claimants with a
method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to
warrant individual litigation.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). See generally Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 373, 385–86 (2008) (discussing factors that limit workers’ access to the
court system, including the small size of individual claims).
232. See Jarvaise v. Rand Corp., 212 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2002) (suggesting that a
class action would be “superior” to other litigation alternatives in the case because it
would prevent judicial waste and ensure that those unable to afford attorneys in
individual suits will have “their day in court”); see also Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp.,
109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that attorneys do not take contingency
cases with low potential payouts); Scott v. Aetna Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 261, 263, 268
(D. Conn. 2002) (deeming class action the superior method for overtime claims
partly because “cost of individual litigation is prohibitive”); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s
Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 85–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting individual suits may
be infeasible given workers’ lack of “adequate financial resources,” “access to
lawyers,” “fear of reprisals,” and “the transient nature of their work”); Juliet M.
Brodie, Post-Welfare Lawyering: Clinical Legal Education and a New Poverty Law Agenda,
20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 201, 248–49 (2006) (“[T]he wage and hour cases of the
working poor . . . tend to involve relatively small dollar figures, prohibitively small for
a private attorney.”).
233. Discovery and legal fees are less costly than commonly assumed, but still well
above what is feasible for individual wage claims. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E.
Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 769–70
(2010) (reporting that a survey of federal cases in 2008 showed “median litigation
costs, including attorneys’ fees, of $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants”
“[i]n cases in which one or more types of discovery was reported”).
234. A one-day deposition rarely costs under a thousand dollars for court reporter
transcription services because a transcript of 300–500 pages typically costs about
$3.50 per page. See, e.g., What Are Your Corporate Rates?, NAPLES REPORTING,
http://www.naplesreporting.com/faq/rates/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (providing
further that digital reporters cost $2.75 per page).
235. See, e.g., Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of
Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183–84 (2d Cir. 2007) (opining on attorney fee motion that
“[the] court (unfortunately) bears the burden of disciplining the market, stepping
into the shoes of the reasonable, paying client, who wishes to pay the least amount
necessary to litigate the case effectively”).

MOSS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE SECOND-CLASS CLASS ACTION

3/20/2012 7:49 PM

563

litigation expenses, which attorneys are reluctant to bear for modest
claims, but also, especially for low-wage workers, a risk of employer
236
retaliation and costly time off from hourly-paying work (often
involving a job with long or inflexible hours) to help craft allegations,
237
Due to the limited prospect of individual
review facts, etc.
litigation, employers inclined to violate wage laws face little financial
incentive to comply.
Furthermore, government enforcement is not sufficiently
widespread or aggressive for substantial deterrence. The agencies
enforcing employment laws lack the resources to investigate many
238
Even when filed, government actions rarely
individual cases.
239
achieve full damages or industry-wide relief.
For example,
investigators at the federal Department of Labor Wage and Hour
Division are instructed not to include the double damages permitted
by law in negotiations with employers, and to seek back pay for just
240
two years of the three that the statute of limitations allows.
Also,
236. See Ruan, supra note 188, at 410–11 (describing potential forms of retaliation
such as job loss, “being assigned to less favorable tasks,” “ostraci[sm] from coworkers” and even being “black list[ed]” by their industries).
237. See Braun v. Wal-Mart, Inc., No. 19-CO-01-9790, 2003 WL 22990114, at *12
(D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2003) (“[M]embers of the class have little practical ability to
prosecute their claims in separate actions, in light of the substantial cost associated
with gathering and presenting the evidence . . . . [I]ndividual claimants effectively
would be denied any remedy because the expense of prosecuting individual claims
likely would vastly exceed the [recovery] amount . . . .”); Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 9
Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 570 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that any recovery may be reduced by
expenses such as “travel expenses and time off from work”); see also Ruckelshaus,
supra note 231, at 387 (“As the fight in court against the employer progressed, the
individual worker would have to continue to make period fee payments [to his
lawyer], pay for discovery, preliminary discovery motions, and any substantive legal
motions filed by either side.”).
238. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-458T, DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR: WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION’S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES
LEAVE LOW WAGE WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT 9 (2009) (reporting that
Department of Labor staff admitted to being short on resources, and that as a result
not all reported cases are adequately addressed); Elizabeth J. Kennedy, The Invisible
Corner: Expanding Workplace Rights for Female Day Laborers, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 126, 153 (2010) (“The underfunding of labor and employment law enforcement
agencies has perpetuated an informal domestic work economy with minimum
consequences for employers who ignore the few workplace rights that domestic
workers do possess.”); Just Pay: Improving Wage and Hour Enforcement at the United
States Department of Labor, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT 15 (2010), www.nelp.org/page//Justice/2010/JustPayReport2010.pdf?nocdn=1 (advocating that Wage and Hour
Division “develop a tiered triage system to sort worker complaints into high-,
medium-, and low-priority levels”).
239. See Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in Employment
Discrimination Cases: A Call for Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735, 772–73 (2008)
(arguing that EEOC fails to secure full damages available under anti-discrimination
law).
240. See Just Pay: Improving Wage and Hour Enforcement at the United States Department
of Labor, supra note 238, at 10 (“[T]he [Wage and Hour Division]’s Field Operations
Handbook . . . instructs WHD investigators only to seek up to two years of back
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because most government investigations are driven by a particular
claim, investigators are not required to expand their investigations to
include a claimant’s similarly-situated coworkers, even though
employers typically subject all workers in a job category to the same
241
pay practices.
Wage claims thus make far more economic sense to litigate in
aggregate rather than individual private lawsuits. Collective actions
limit the above-detailed burdens on any one worker and increase the
amount in controversy, justifying an attorney’s investment of time
and out-of-pocket expense, especially because litigation costs do not
increase proportionately with the number of workers participating.
Courts may assess back wages based on statistical or representative
242
evidence, because liability evidence (e.g., that a certain job is not
243
exempt) typically does not require testimony from every worker,
and because sample testimony suffices for the estimates needed in
244
wage violation cases.
3.

Importance of notification for workers unaware of violations
245
Employees are often unaware their rights have been violated,

wages, and not liquidated damages, which are nearly universally awarded under the
statute, and does not instruct them to consider whether the violations are willful and
subject to a three-year statute of limitations.”).
241. Cf. id. at 9–10 (recommending that the government “identify industries
marked by rampant employment law violations” and target those industries through
proactive investigations instead of solely following up on individual complaints).
242. See, e.g., Martin v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 952 F.2d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir.
1992) (considering when back pay is to be awarded “to the nontestifying employees
based on the fairly representative testimony of the testifying employees”).
243. See, e.g., Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., 318 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 2003)
(recognizing that “not all employees need testify in order to prove FLSA violations or
recoup back-wages”); Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 701 (3d Cir. 1994)
(condoning the use of testimony of twenty-two of seventy employees because
“[c]ourts commonly allow representative employees to prove violations with respect
to all employees”); McLaughlin v. Ho Fat Seto, 850 F.2d 586, 589 (9th Cir. 1988)
(disagreeing with the defendant’s contention that no pattern of FLSA violations
could be proven because only five of twenty-eight employees testified); Donovan v.
Simmons Petroleum Corp., 725 F.2d 83, 86 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
testimony of twelve employees supported award to all workers after clarifying that not
all injured workers need to testify to establish a prima facie case); Donovan v. New
Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1982) (upholding district court’s
use of twenty-three employees’ testimony to support award to 207 employees).
244. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687–88 (1946) (noting
that hours may be proven by oral testimony because “[e]mployees seldom keep . . .
records [of their hours] themselves”).
245. See Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 566 (Cal. 2007) (“[I]ndividual
employees may not sue because they are unaware that their legal rights have been
violated.”); Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 100
(N.J. 2006) (“[W]ithout the availability of a class-action mechanism, many consumerfraud victims may never realize that they may have been wronged.”).
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246

especially the low-wage, often immigrant workers disproportionately
247
comprising the pool of workers paid sub-minimum wages.
Employers may declare workers exempt from minimum and overtime
248
wage rules by misinterpreting FLSA exemptions or misclassifying
249
both full-time and part-time workers as independent contractors.
Some wage violations can be hidden from even sophisticated workers:
gender wage discrimination often is proven only by statistical analysis
250
comparing workers’ pay data; and irregular commissions may be
payable only if the employer receives the customer payment, not
251
when the employee makes the sale.
246. See, e.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS 15 (2005) (observing that many immigrants will spend time working for less
than minimum wage); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of
Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2009) (“American demand for
inexpensive goods draws international migrants to our factories and fields.”); Noah
D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage As A Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative to Antipoverty
Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 4.
247. Poverty law scholars have noted the “[d]issonance between the rhetoric of
supporting work and the reality of denying work’s rewards.” See Julie A. Nice, Forty
Years of Welfare Policy Experimentation: No Acres, No Mule, No Politics, No Rights, 4 NW.
J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 1–2, 4 (2009) (explaining that policy efforts to reduce welfare
dependence have not successfully addressed the need for livable wages); see also JOEL
F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
6–7 (2007) (arguing that America has “demonized welfare” while those who “‘play[]
by the rules’” cannot make it because of stagnant wages in the low-wage labor
market); Peter B. Edelman, Changing the Subject: From Welfare to Poverty to a Living
Income, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 14, 14, 16–17 (2009) (documenting history of
America’s simultaneous rhetoric against welfare and lack of support for higher
wages).
248. See Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (explaining that plaintiffs accuse defendants of having misrepresented to
employees that they were exempt and not entitled to overtime pay); Kamens v.
Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (providing that
plaintiffs alleged sufficient affirmative misrepresentations by employer to toll the
statute of limitations for their claims); Gentry, 165 P.3d at 567 (“The likelihood of
employee unawareness is even greater when, as alleged in the present case, the
employer does not simply fail to pay overtime but affirmatively tells its employees that
they are not eligible for overtime.”).
249. See, e.g., Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 556 F. Supp. 2d 284, 286–88,
295 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment against
garment workers claiming employers misclassified them as independent contractors
to claim unlawful wage deductions); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 255
F. Supp. 2d 184, 185–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting delivery workers partial summary
judgment as to liability on unpaid minimum and overtime wage claims and holding
that workers were not independent contractors and thus that defendants were “liable
to [plaintiffs] for violations of the FLSA and New York Labor law”); Lopez v.
Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 406–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding as a matter of law
that garment industry “jobber” and garment manufacturer jointly employed
plaintiffs).
250. See, e.g., Velez v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 244 F.R.D. 243, 259–64 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (describing plaintiff’s use of statistical evidence to attempt to prove
defendant’s gender discrimination bias in performance evaluations, pay, and
promotions, as well as discrimination on account of pregnancy).
251. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Burlington Broadcasters Inc., 744 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56 (App. Div.
2002) (noting that by contract plaintiff was entitled to commissions on her sales only
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Collective actions increase awareness of workplace abuses, whether
through court-supervised employee notification or through plaintiffs’
attorneys’ own efforts to find and to notify additional workers—
efforts that become more cost-effective when counsel has assurance
252
that the case will qualify as a collective action. Timely notification
also helps workers who might not otherwise become aware that their
wage rights were violated until it is too late: unlike in Rule 23 class
actions, where all statutes of limitations are tolled until the court
grants or denies class certification, the FLSA expressly states that
limitations periods keep running for each individual until he or she
253
opts in as a plaintiff. The notice process also points workers to class
counsel for legal advice and lets them know they are not alone in
254
challenging violations.
Plaintiffs need not file collective actions, of course; they can sue
alone, or in a small group, in which case § 216(b) opt-in, notification,
and certification processes are irrelevant. But when plaintiffs choose
to broaden their wage cases into opt-in collective actions, they
typically need to notify other potential members; such notice is
hindered by courts’ restrictive “certification” standards.
4.

The impact of certification motions: litigation cost; delay as limitations
periods run and fewer attorneys available
Even where courts grant certification, the motion process imposes
substantial costs. First, because courts demand substantial evidentiary
showings on certification motions, attorneys must devote significant
time to the following efforts: procuring dozens of worker affidavits;
taking multiple depositions; requesting and reviewing discovery
255
Second, as with any
documents; and writing the motion itself.
“when the customer paid,” not as soon as she made the sale).
252. Cuzco v. Orion Builders, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“[F]or the intended benefits of the collective action[,] including allowing plaintiffs
to pool resources and enabling courts to efficiently resolve multiple similar claims . . .
, employees must receive ‘accurate and timely notice . . . so that they can make
informed decisions about whether to participate.’” (quoting Hoffmann-La Roche v.
Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989))).
253. See 29 U.S.C. § 256 (2006) (providing that opt-in plaintiff’s claim commences
for limitations purposes not on lawsuit’s filing but “on the subsequent date . . .
written consent is filed”).
254. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and
the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L & POL’Y J. 59, 91 (2005)
(discussing studies showing workers “are more likely to exercise rights where they
have an agent that assists them in use of those rights”); see also Pentland v. Dravo
Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945) (noting collective actions “bring[] something
of the strength of collective bargaining” to suits risking employer retaliation).
255. See, e.g., Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 8819(GEL), 2006 WL
2853971, at *4–8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) (examining in detail the dueling affidavits
of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ witnesses, as well as multiple transcripts of deposition
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major motion, the attorneys can spend months briefing and arguing
the motion, plus additional months waiting for the court’s decision.
During this time, the two-year statute of limitations period “clock”
keeps ticking for each potential member until she joins the action,
256
Third, because the
resulting in unrecoverable lost wages.
certification process increases both litigation costs and the risk of lost
257
claims due to delay, a few private law firms tend to dominate wage
collective actions to the exclusion of small firms and non-profit
258
lawyers who could also advocate well for workers.
In short, the cumbersome process, regardless of whether a court
grants or denies a motion to certify, substantially impedes workers
attempting to vindicate their statutory rights. This situation is
especially troubling because, as discussed below, the entire endeavor
of scrutinizing cases for collective action certification is misguided.
III. COURTS SHOULD ALLOW PLAINTIFFS TO FILE COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
FREELY, WITHOUT CERTIFICATION MOTIONS
While Part II argued against courts’ prevailing two-step, Rule 23style “certification” process for collective actions, this Part details a
different way courts should handle collective actions. Part III.A
begins by surveying existing scholarship critiquing § 216(b): some
commentaries argue for broader willingness to certify collective
actions; others call for tighter application of Rule 23 standards,
perhaps even a repeal of § 216(b); but no scholarship argues that
requiring an evidentiary “certification” motion lacks the textual
authorization or agency-cost rationale that justifies requiring
certification of Rule 23 class actions.
Part III.B details this Article’s prescription in three parts, one for
each player in a collective action lawsuit—the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the court. In short, plaintiffs could file and opt in to
testimony, after lengthy briefing of both parties).
256. 29 U.S.C. § 256.
257. See Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 4 (“The high cost of notifying absent
class members when potential recovery is very small deters entrepreneurial attorneys
from bringing meritorious suits. Thus, the rule harms, rather than protects, absent
class members.”).
258. For information regarding impact worker rights litigation by non-profits, see,
for example, Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., 495 F.3d 403, 404–05 (7th Cir.
2007) (involving a FLSA action for migrant farmworkers’ unpaid wages, brought by
the National Employment Law Project (NELP)); Moon v. Kwon, 248 F. Supp. 2d 201,
203 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (involving an action for hotel workers’ unpaid wages, brought by
the Asian American Legal Defense & Education Fund (AALDEF)); Ansoumana v.
Gristede’s Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (naming NELP as one
of the plaintiffs’ attorneys in an action for supermarket delivery workers’ unpaid
wages).
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collective actions freely without any certification motion, while
defendants would bear the burden of challenging collective actions
in Rule 21 misjoinder or Rule 12 dismissal motions. Courts, although
lacking Rule 23 gatekeeping powers, would still wield three basic
powers: deciding defense motions; supervising requested notice to
potential opt-ins; and policing whatever modest asymmetric
information and principal-agent problems may arise in multipleplaintiff representation, by enforcing ethics rules on avoiding
conflicting interests and ensuring clients remain informed decision
makers. Finally, Part III.C notes that this prescription would not only
bring judicial practice into compliance with federal statutes and
rules, but also decrease litigation costs, speed up litigation, and
facilitate vindication of important rights in collective actions.
A. Existing Calls for Reform: Stricter Scrutiny Versus Broader
Certification—But No Questioning of the Premise
The academic commentary on § 216(b) is sparse but features
varied calls for reform. Of those commentators who have written on
the issue, many dislike § 216(b) entirely, preferring the tougher Rule
23 criteria. One “urges Congress to abolish collective actions by
repealing § 216(b),” leaving wage actions governed by Rule 23
because “§ 216(b) was drafted during the infancy of group litigation
259
and is an antiquated vestige.”
Another argues that the prevailing
“two-stage, ad hoc approach” to certification “fails to provide courts
with proper guidance in determining whether plaintiffs [are]
similarly situated,” and that courts should apply Rule 23 standards to
260
§ 216(b) collective actions.
Others, though noting that § 216(b) originated as a mere joinder
261
262
device, believe courts should undertake a more “rigorous analysis”
that more routinely rejects collective actions—even where workers
263
They further argue that, unless the
are “similarly situated.”
plaintiffs’ common issues are substantial enough to “expressly permit
common answers” for each, “the court must . . . determine if it is fair
and efficient to try the case in one proceeding, notwithstanding that
264
those initially joining the action may be ‘similarly situated.’”
This
view parallels the Supreme Court’s holding in Wal-Mart Stores that the

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Lopez, supra note 20, at 278–79.
Fraser, supra note 20, at 122.
King & Ozumba, supra note 19, at 281.
Id. at 281, 300–01.
Id. at 273.
Id. (emphasis omitted).

MOSS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE SECOND-CLASS CLASS ACTION

3/20/2012 7:49 PM

569

class action commonality requirement is stricter than the joinder
265
requirement of one common issue.
Others call for broader permission for § 216(b) collective actions
but still assume a judicial power to condition such cases on an
evidentiary motion for certification. One commentator asserts that
the “opt-in feature raises a presumption of active, informed” class
members, an argument with three implications: (1) it “sav[es] courts
from having to conduct detailed inquiries into whether each . . .
member’s interests are adequately represented,” (2) it “better
justif[ies] a conditional certification,” and (3) it justifies “plac[ing]
the burden upon any party . . . challeng[ing] class certification on
266
grounds of insufficient plaintiff protections.” Yet that commentator
still accepts courts’ “managerial responsibility” to scrutinize “evidence
that opt-in members’ interests are not being adequately represented
267
or protected.”
Two others believe courts should more liberally certify collective
actions, even where workers’ claims vary, by using sampling
268
techniques.
For instance, courts could “select a test group of
plaintiffs . . . and opt-ins” for limited discovery and early dispositive
269
As another option, courts could preside over “a
motions.
representative trial as in a class action,” with a defense victory ending
the case or a plaintiff’s victory allowing a plaintiffs’ motion for partial
summary judgment “on the basis of non-mutual offensive issue
270
preclusion . . . [to] extend[] the trial rulings” to other plaintiffs.
Surprisingly, no commentary appears to argue that a requirement
of proving “certification” lacks the textual authorization or agencycost rationale that exists for Rule 23 class actions. The difficult
question is what would replace the current scheme; following is what
this Article offers as a preferable alternative.
B. The Prescription: Allow Plaintiffs to File Together, Leaving the Burden
on Defendants to Challenge Similarity, Without Judicial “Gatekeeping” Power
This Article prescribes that courts apply a streamlined method
when assessing the propriety of collective actions, but that they
should generally refrain from making such an assessment at all,
except under certain circumstances. This subpart elaborates upon

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
Gates, supra note 20, at 1554–55 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1555.
Borgen & Ho, supra note 19, at 155–56.
Id.
Id. at 156.
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this streamlined method by considering in turn the proper roles of
plaintiffs, defendants, and courts.
1.

Plaintiff’s role: to file collective actions at will, in the same manner as
multiple-plaintiff captions under joinder rules
Plaintiffs should have a recognized right to bring a collective action
upon pleading that other workers are similarly situated—and those
other workers should have a recognized right to file an opt-in consent
without having to file any motion seeking judicial approval. Such a
rule would be a vast departure from existing practice, but one district
court so held in 1946 when it found that § 216(b) grants:
[a] right to intervene . . . [that] appears to be unconditional
because the statute expressly indicates that one or more employees
similarly situated can jointly originate such an action . . . regardless
of the ordinary requirements of law as to proper joinder . . . . [I]t
would be an excessively strict construction which would say that
parties who have an absolute right to join as plaintiffs have less
than an absolute right . . . to become plaintiffs after its
271
commencement.

No courts have cited this decision in decades, but its approach is
correct: plaintiffs pressing claims as “similarly situated” could opt in
freely, absent the sort of motion, detailed below, challenging the
propriety of their joinder.
2.

Defendant’s role: to file misjoinder or dismissal motions, with the burden
of disproving sufficient commonality for joinder
A defense motion is the proper method of redress when plaintiffs
try to aggregate § 216(b)-covered claims that vary too widely for the
workers to be considered “similarly situated.” Some § 216(b)
272
claimants may well be too varied for a collective action, but that
does not mean the plaintiffs must be the ones filing motions or be
held to heightened evidentiary proof of commonality. Because Rule
20 is far more relevant to § 216(b) cases than Rule 23, courts should
handle challenges to § 216(b) collective action status like they handle
challenges to Rule 20 joinder of multiple plaintiffs’ claims.
Specifically, the two rules allowing challenges to Rule 20 joinder
should apply equally to issues of collective action status under §
216(b).
First, Rule 21 “misjoinder”: in circumstances such as those where
271. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local 123, 5 F.R.D. 174, 176 (N.D. Ala.
1946).
272. See supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text.
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discovery undercuts the allegations that initially justified joinder,
“[o]n motion . . . the court may at any time, on just terms, add or
273
drop a party.” Such an order would then wholly undo the Rule 20
joinder by dividing the plaintiffs’ claims into independent cases.
Second, Rule 42(b) “severance”: a court may keep the parties
joined but order separate trials for each plaintiff, or for various
groups of plaintiffs, if it deems doing so necessary “[f]or
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize [the
274
proceedings].”
One 1946 decision, though not citing Rule 42,
noted that plaintiffs may be “similarly situated” enough to satisfy §
216(b) but still need separate trials:
while the claims . . . are similar in certain respects and enough . . .
[to be] similarly situated . . . still . . . it will be necessary for the
cases to be tried separately to determine whether . . . [each]
275
particular person [is] within the [FLSA] provisions . . . .

That decision has drawn no citations for decades, but it is exactly
the result many modern courts denying “certification” should reach:
plaintiffs sharing FLSA claims against the same employer are amply
“similarly situated” even if their claims vary enough for each plaintiff,
or subgroups of plaintiffs, to justify separate trials under Rule 42.
Modern courts typically do not wait for defendants to challenge
aggregation.
As detailed above, though, it was how courts
entertained challenges to original Rule 23(a)(3) spurious class
actions, which are the closest analogues to § 216(b) cases. For
example, in Lipsett v. United States, the court recognized that:
the striking of the allegations of a spurious class action ought
generally to be improper unless the court knows no intervention is
possible. . . . Since the spurious class action is a mere device for
permissive joinder, the proper procedure is to leave the allegation
standing to facilitate . . . intervention. “If it shall later appear that
the plaintiffs are not able within a reasonable time to obtain others
to intervene in the class action it may properly be dismissed as a
276
class action.”
273. FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
274. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b); Gaffney v. Riverboat Servs. of Ind., Inc., 451 F.3d 424,
442 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 662 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (allowing plaintiffs to proceed through discovery with joined claims despite
potential prejudice, with court “retain[ing] flexibility to sever portions of [claims] or
to take other remedial actions, if necessary,” later in the case). See generally WRIGHT,
MILLER & KANE, supra note 116, § 1660 (“The general philosophy of the joinder
provisions . . . is to allow virtually unlimited joinder at the pleading stage but to give
the district court discretion to shape the trial . . . .”).
275. Wright v. U.S. Rubber Co., 69 F. Supp. 621, 623 (S.D. Iowa 1946).
276. Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1966) (emphasis added)
(quoting Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944)
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3.

Court’s role: to decide parties’ motions and police ethics violations
By requiring each member to opt in, § 216(b) collective actions
avoid the substantial agency problems of Rule 23 class actions. An
opt-in action is little different from a standard case with five or thirty
plaintiffs in the caption: whether each is well-informed, or actively
involved, depends on issues such as education level, language
barriers, and attorney honesty. So, the threat of plaintiffs’ lawyers
neglecting opt-ins is not different in kind from ethical concerns
arising in any case, individual or aggregate. Accordingly, courts in
collective actions not only lack the authority Rule 23 grants over the
decisions of plaintiffs and counsel, but also the agency rationale that
would make such powers a normatively sound idea.
The fact that collective actions do not raise substantial agency
concerns, however, does not mean courts have no role. Courts have
two critical roles to fulfill in collective actions, each detailed below:
(a) deciding parties’ motions on the propriety of collective actions
and of court-ordered notice; and (b) policing violations of ethics
rules about jointly representing multiple plaintiffs.
a.

Deciding parties’ motions on the propriety of collective actions and
court-ordered notice

Despite lacking the power to “certify” a collective action and to
require plaintiffs to file motions seeking such certification, courts
remain empowered to decide the propriety of a § 216(b) collective
action. As Part III.B.2 above details, courts would decide whether
workers are “similarly situated” on defendants’ motions for Rule 12
dismissal or Rule 21 misjoinder—but the standard would be simple
joinder, not the more searching “commonality” inquiry.
Further, courts would decide whether court-ordered notice is
proper—but the inquiry would extend only to the propriety and
contents of the notice, not to the whether the entire collective action
should proceed. Should the court wish to address the “similarly
situated” issue contemporaneously with its “notice” decision, the
joinder rules remain the proper vehicle: Rule 21 allows a court “on
its own,” to consider whether there is “misjoinder;” the court simply
must apply the joinder standard, not the current heightened
commonality standard.

(emphasis added)).
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Policing violations of ethics rules when jointly representing multiple
plaintiffs

Although fewer agency problems exist in collective actions,
collective actions raise enough ethical issues to suggest a watchdog
277
role for courts. First, especially in large cases, many opt-in plaintiffs
participate little if at all: they may lack voice in major decisions like
class-wide settlements or attorneys may not fully apprise them of case
events. Second, plaintiffs may have conflicting interests, such as if a
group of assistant managers seeks overtime pay, while a second group
worked off-the-clock because their timesheets were altered by the first
group. Third, clients may be unaware when their attorneys lack the
experience or resources for major § 216(b) collective actions. Legal
278
ethics rules address these three problems:
• attorneys must allow each client to exercise decision-making
authority over major decisions like filing suit, responding to
279
a settlement offer, or ending the case on other terms,
280
each of which requires keeping clients informed;
• where attorneys represent multiple clients, they must
procure informed consent if the clients’ interests may
277. See supra Part II.A.4.b.
278. While no single binding set of attorney ethics rules exists, the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) are “the primary model for the ethics
rules governing . . . the overwhelming majority of American lawyers.” Lucian T.
Pera, Grading ABA Leadership on Legal Ethics Leadership: State Adoption of the Revised
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 637, 637 (2005). The
Model Rules were adopted by over 40 states and are “influential . . . in states that had
chosen not to adopt them.” Id. at 640. Discussion herein will thus cite the Model
Rules and state cases based on those rules.
279. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by
a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . consult with
the client as to the means by which they are pursued. A lawyer may take such action
on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation
[and] shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”); see id. R. 1.2 cmt.
1 (“Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the
purposes to be served by legal representation . . . . The decisions specified in
paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the
client.”).
280. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2)–(4) (“A lawyer shall . . . (2)
reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives
are to be accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of
the matter; [and] (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information . . .
.”); see id. R. 1.4 cmt. 1 (providing that “[r]easonable communication between lawyer
and client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation”);
In re Grievance Proceeding, 171 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84 (D. Conn. 2001) (“Implicit in
Rule 1.2(a)’s requirement that a lawyer ‘shall abide by a client’s decision . . . ’ [is] a
requirement to communicate all settlement offers to the client.”); see also Carranza v.
Fraas, 763 F. Supp. 2d 113, 125–26 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying D.C. Rule and observing
that “[w]ithholding . . . information [regarding settlement offers] precludes a
client’s ability to participate . . . in decisions that go to the core of the attorney-client
relationship”).
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281

conflict and must withdraw if the interests conflict too
282
deeply; and attorneys should litigate cases competently,
and in complex or specialized fields, with adequate
283
experience.
Because collective action motions do not presumptively pose
agency problems like Rule 23 class actions, courts do not need to
impose a collective action certification motion as a prophylactic
measure. Rather, courts could police ethics problems on motions
filed by defendants or by sua sponte court orders.
As a limited prophylactic measure, however, courts should require
plaintiffs’ counsel to provide opt-in plaintiffs with notice and an
opportunity to participate in major case events, based on the ethics
rules requiring counsel to keep the client reasonably informed and
284
reasonably consult with the client on significant tactics.
The
“reasonably” qualifier provides attorneys and courts with some
discretion about what measures are practical; the determination will
depend on factors including the number of plaintiffs and the
285
substantiality of the particular decision in question.
If courts apply the ethics rules requiring plaintiffs’ counsel to
281. Unless the client gives informed consent, in addition to other requirements,
a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest . . . [which] exists if: (1) the representation of
one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client . . . .
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)–(b).
282. See, e.g., FDIC v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1317 (5th Cir. 1995)
(affirming district court ruling that attorney “will likely be compelled to furnish
testimony that may be substantially adverse to his client” because he “is a necessary
witness”).
283. “A lawyer shall provide competent representation[, which] requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary . . . .” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1.
[F]actors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the
matter . . . [,] the lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question,
the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it
is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of
established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the
required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a
particular field of law may be required in some circumstances.
Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 1; see also Fed. Grievance Comm. v. Spat, No. 3:99 GP 23 (JBA), 2006
WL 1050039, at *1 & n.3 (D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2006) (analyzing, under Connecticut
rule identical to Model Rule 1.1, attorney’s failure to review a file prior to
appearing); In re Dean, 401 B.R. 917, 925 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008) (analyzing
attorney’s behavior under Idaho rule identical to Model Rule 1.1).
284. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2)–(4).
285. For example, with 100,000 plaintiffs, requiring attorneys to notify plaintiffs of
every motion would be impractical unless the process were as easy as sending a single
email. But with twenty plaintiffs, ethical representation would entail the same level
of attorney-client communication as in a single-plaintiff case.
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consult with clients and keep them reasonably informed, that would
suffice to assure adequate representation—as much as it can be
assured in any case. A more thorough Rule 23(a)(4) inquiry into
plaintiffs’ counsel is not justified by the agency and asymmetric
information problems that justify it for Rule 23 class actions. Without
such express authority as Rule 23(a)(4) provides for class actions,
courts cannot claim a power over choice of counsel because of the
principle that “a party’s right to representation by the attorney of its
choice . . . is a valued right and any restrictions must be carefully
286
scrutinized.”
C. Ramifications of the Prescription: Fewer Costly Motions and Improper
Denials; Minimal Risk of Excessive Collective Actions
Is there much difference between maintaining the current §
216(b) certification practice and, instead, presumptively allowing
collective actions while permitting defendants the option to
challenge collective status? The difference is in the details, but it is
quite substantial.
First, there is a significant difference between a motion about one
common issue—the joinder standard that this Article argues should
apply—and the seven-part Rule 23 certification motion. After WalMart Stores, the once-modest Rule 23(a) commonality requirement is
now strictly construed to demand that “claims must depend upon a
common contention,” defined as not just any common issue, but an
issue so fundamental that “determination of its truth or falsity will
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims
287
in one stroke.”
Virtually all collective actions that courts reject
288
because of differing job duties or supervisors would amply meet the
proper joinder standard, so long as plaintiffs share a single common
issue of law or fact. Any claims that the same employer violated the
same statutory provision (e.g., the overtime pay requirement) would
meet the joinder requirement, absent extenuating circumstances like
identical statutory claims relying on entirely different factual
289
evidence and legal doctrines.
Second, if the applicable standard is the simple joinder
requirement of one common issue, some defendants would choose
not to make a motion against collective action status. Where a
286.
1987).
287.
288.
289.

S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. 777 S.H. Corp., 508 N.E.2d 647, 650 (N.Y.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text.
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motion would be futile, some lawyers might be ignorant or unethical
enough to file one anyway, but experience with dispositive motions
shows defendants may decline to make even high-stakes motions
when doing so would be futile. Despite the increased prevalence and
success of dispositive motions in recent decades, as the Supreme
290
Court broadened the grounds for both Rule 12 dismissal and Rule
291
56 summary judgment, defendants sometimes decline to make Rule
292
12 or 56 motions.
Not all, but many, wage cases are ideal for
aggregate treatment because of the obvious, substantial similarity of
293
the claims;
under this Article’s proposal, defense motions
challenging collective action status in such cases would be
unsuccessful.
Third, even if there is a defense motion, it likely would be one
motion rather than two as under existing practice—thus halving
294
motion costs and lessening motion-imposed delay.
To be sure,
some defendants could try to file one motion early (e.g., on the
complaint) and one later (e.g., on evidence adduced in discovery)—
but not always, and even so, such motions would likely merge with
dismissal or summary judgment motions the defendant was already
filing.
Fourth, federal courts try to weed out hopeless motions in advance,
290. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 829–30 (2010) (discussing the Supreme Court’s radical
changes to the law on pleading starting in 2007, when the Court “added a
requirement for claimants that goes above and beyond having to give notice” and a
“requirement that at the pleading stage the plaintiff has the burden of establishing . .
. the complaint’s plausibility as to liability on the merits” (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)).
291. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 73 (1990) (observing that “docket pressures on the federal
judiciary have prompted dramatic revisions in federal procedure,” and discussing a
1986 “trilogy of cases . . . [that] significantly expanded the applicability of summary
judgment under Rule 56”).
292. There of course are no citations to judicial decisions on summary judgment
motions that parties never file, but the docket reports in various cases show an
absence of a summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Hens v. ClientLogic Operating
Corp., No. 05-0381 (W.D.N.Y.) (docket reflecting no dispositive motions, with final
approval of settlement Dec. 21, 2010); Clark v. Ecolab, Inc., No. 07-8623 (S.D.N.Y.)
(docket reflecting no dispositive motions, with final approval of settlement May 19,
2010); Mohney v. Shelly’s Prime Steak, Stone Crab & Oyster Bar, No. 06-4270
(S.D.N.Y.) (docket reflecting no dispositive motions, with final approval of
settlement Dec. 8, 2009).
293. See, e.g., Shain v. Armour & Co., 40 F. Supp. 488, 490 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (“The
evident purpose of the [FLSA] is to provide one law suit in which the claims of
different employees, different in amount but all arising out of the same character of
employment, can be presented and adjudicated, regardless of the fact that they are
separate and independent of each other.”).
294. As detailed earlier, avoiding delay is particularly important for workers whose
claims diminish under the statute of limitations until they opt in, especially low-wage
workers with great need for all wages they earn. See supra Part II.B.3.
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such as by requiring short pre-motion letters—typically no longer
295
than three pages—before the filing of certain types of motions.
Under this Article’s proposal, defense decertification motions would
likely require summarized pre-motion letters to the court. Many
courts’ rules requiring pre-motion letters for Rule 12 dismissal and
296
Rule 56 summary judgment motions
already would cover
decertification motions filed under those rules.
Finally, as a policy matter, this is an area where false negatives are
more worrisome than false positives. False negatives—improper
rejections of collective actions—are a major problem because, as
detailed above, disallowing a collective action is a death knell for
297
workers seeking to vindicate important statutory rights. In contrast,
false positives—allowing collective actions to proceed when doing so
is overly costly or unfair to defendants—is less of a concern. Most
collective actions are wage claims, which, even if borderline as to
commonality, are simple enough to litigate together. For example, in
a case where employees in four different job categories each
experienced different wage violations, the plaintiffs would just need
to show evidence of the four fact patterns, not litigate a full individual
trial for each member.
Age or equal pay claims more often may lack sufficient
commonality than wage claims; but, as some of the leading ADEA
collective actions illustrate, many age collective actions do focus on a
single common retirement or reduction-in-force decision applicable
298
to all plaintiffs.
Ultimately, where claims vary too much for
collective adjudication—whether FLSA, ADEA, or EPA claims—
defendants should prevail on their misjoinder or dismissal motions.
This Article’s proposal still lets courts reject collective actions for too295. E.g., E.D.N.Y. LOC. CIV. R. 37.3 (requiring that before any discovery motion,
party must file a “letter not exceeding three pages in length outlining the nature of
the dispute and attaching relevant materials,” which may yield a “[d]ecision of the
[c]ourt” before any formal motion).
296. See, e.g., Individual Motion Practice and Rules of Judge Joseph F. Bianco, E.D.N.Y.,
R. III(A), available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/pub/rules/JFB-MLR.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2011) (requiring, before filing dismissal or summary judgment
motion, “the moving party shall submit a letter not to exceed three pages in length
setting forth the basis for the anticipated motion,” with opponent entitled to file
letter as well).
297. See supra Part II.B.
298. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 168 (1989) (deciding
ADEA discrimination claim under § 216(b) involving a single “reduction in work
force [that] discharged or demoted some 1,200 workers”); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec.
Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1100 (10th Cir. 2001) (considering ADEA claim under
§ 216(b) in which plaintiffs alleged that new management determined older workers
were “‘blocking’ the advancement of younger, newly recruited employees,” and
requested human resources to “prepare severance worksheets” and terminate older
employees (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

MOSS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

578

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/20/2012 7:49 PM

[Vol. 61:523

varied claims—so long as courts do so on properly filed defense
motions, rather than by imposing on plaintiffs the current improper
requirements of evidentiary motions and heightened commonality
standards.
IV. WHY COURTS MAKE THESE ERRORS: INNOCENT AND LESS
INNOCENT EXPLANATIONS
When courts err, why do they err? Two possible explanations exist
for courts’ misinterpretations of § 216(b), one relatively innocent and
the other less so. While some may credit one over the other, each
likely carries some truth.
A. Path Dependence: In a Complex, Once-Obscure Field, Relying on
Precedent That Proves Misguided
As detailed above, there is a curious history to the now-prevailing
idea that § 216(b) collective actions require a certification motion by
plaintiffs and a two-stage judicial inquiry. In 1995, the Fifth Circuit in
299
Mooney detailed the two-stage certification process, but that process
was based on weak precedent and the court did not actually endorse
it. Tenth and Eleventh Circuit decisions then purported to follow
300
Mooney in endorsing that process, and district courts nationwide cite
301
those three circuit decisions in applying that process.
The stare decisis doctrine of adhering to precedent “provid[es]
302
both continuity and predictability,” but comes with a downside on
vivid display in the § 216(b) case law. Basing decisions on precedent,
rather than de novo analysis, can lock in past error by making law
303
“path-dependent” : each “precedent influences subsequent legal
decisions [that] . . . ‘when decided . . . become, in turn, a part of the
304
legal framework.’”
With decisions basing on precedent, “the
299. Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213–14 (5th Cir. 1995).
300. See supra notes 163–166 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 167–172 and accompanying text.
302. William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction Cost
Economics and the Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 995, 1063 (1996).
303. For analysis on how stare decisis yields path-dependence and lock-in, see, for
example, Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination,
86 VA. L. REV. 727, 742 (2000) (observing that “even small historical events,
particularly those that occur early in the formation of an industry, can have
unexpectedly long-lasting effects . . . [and] produce a path far different from the one
taken in the[ir] absence”); Robert L. Scharff & Francesco Parisi, The Role of Status
Quo Bias and Bayesian Learning in the Creation of New Legal Rights, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
25, 37 (2006) (noting that “[w]here stare decisis is the rule, path dependence is the
inevitable result”).
304. Aceves, supra note 302, at 1062–63 (quoting DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 97 (1990)); see
also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83
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evolution of . . . doctrine will depend, to a large extent, upon the
order in which cases are presented or, in the language of social
305
choice, will be ‘path dependent.’”
Thus when early case law gets something wrong, the status of that
erroneous decision as precedent can perpetuate the holding in
future case law. A party certainly can argue against, or a judge can
reject, a bad precedent, but the doctrine of stare decisis places a
thumb on the scale in favor of a precedent-supported argument over
a new argument. In sum, the tendency of path dependence to lock
in the sub-optimal is an information market failure. What prevails is
not the best idea among a marketplace of freely competing ideas, but
the idea enjoying a privileged status because of its early adoption.
Further, collective action procedure since the mid-1990s is a prime
area in which judges would be strongly disposed to place a thumb on
the scale in favor of following precedent. Even if courts have overinterpreted Hoffmann-La Roche “notice” as supporting complex
certification processes, that case certainly changed matters, forcing
courts to innovate. That need to innovate arose in a field where
courts had little experience because § 216(b) was a unique process,
varying the joinder and class action rules judges applied far more
frequently. A rarely-faced issue imposes high information costs,
making reliance on path-dependent shortcuts, like following
306
precedent, entirely rational. However, this can also lead to missteps
like relying on weak precedents such as Mooney.
Furthering judges’ path-dependent reliance upon precedent is that
judicial decision-making is short on big-picture theory. Some judges
blast academics for being disengaged, focusing on big-picture theory,
307
and neglecting the nuts and bolts of how law really works. Merits of
this criticism aside, judges certainly can err the other way, not
spending time contemplating the big picture because of docket
CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1412 (1995) (describing path dependence as a “negative, and
unintended, consequence” of stare decisis).
305. Stearns, supra note 304, at 1309.
306. See Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Drag: An Essay on Wigs, Robes and Legal Change,
1995 WIS. L. REV. 1129, 1149 (noting that path-dependence can arise when
“seemingly rational actors . . . adopt arguably suboptimal behaviors which they
continue to follow because moving to a better system would involve unacceptable
expense in terms of transition costs, information costs, and/or risk”); Scharff &
Parisi, supra note 303, at 28 (“[W]hen an individual is faced with a new situation
(such as the existence of a new legal right) . . . [t]he rational desire to avoid these
adjustment costs can result in an exaggerated preference for the status quo.”);
307. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (describing issues that have arisen
in legal education and practice that “call[] into question our status as an honorable
profession”).
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308

pressures and case-specific focus.
Judges’ understandable aversion
to big-picture theory may explain why they follow readily available,
on-point precedent like Mooney, rather than critically analyzing how
varied aggregate litigation types relate and differ—such as how one
type (collective actions) presents less principal-agent difficulty than
another (class actions).
Path dependence may not, however, completely explain how early
§ 216(b) precedents established a locked-in bad practice. Stare
decisis is just a thumb on the scale in favor of the argument
precedent supports, but precedents erode when judges are
sufficiently convinced. That is why “[s]tare decisis is a tendency
rather than a rule,” for “if it were a rule, one would get strict path
309
dependence, which no one wants.”
So the question is why
erroneous § 216(b) precedents are the sort that remain followed; it
could be just unfortunate coincidence, or the following additional
explanation may provide the answer.
B. Hostility to Litigation As a Tool of Dispute Resolution and Social Reform
As Andrew Siegel argues in constitutional law, the organizing
theme of the modern Supreme Court is not federalism, originalism,
textualism, or judicial restraint, but hostility to litigation as a tool of
310
Justices who are generally
dispute resolution and social reform.
pro-states’ rights aggressively rein in state litigation by broadly
311
preempting state law with federal law;
while originalist and
textualist Justices reject those methods when ahistorical, atextual
308. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of
Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803, 816 (2009)
(noting that judges “may be interested in ‘truth’ or ‘edification’ . . . not as an end
itself . . . but only to the extent that these serve the end of reaching a decision, a
holding, an order and decree” because their focus must be on “the resolution of
disputes, the rendition of decisions, . . . and the clearing of dockets”).
Or as Judge Constance Baker Motley told one of us (Moss) when, as a law clerk,
he handed her an unreasonably long draft judicial opinion (roughly 15,000 words)
that took far too long to write: “We decide cases here; we don’t write law review
articles.”
309. Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of
Public Choice, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 288 (1992).
310. See generally Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1097 (2006).
311. “One might expect a Court committed to protecting state autonomy and
limiting federal regulatory authority to be sympathetic to arguments that state laws
should not easily be overridden by federal laws”—but the modern Court “has
consistently rejected” that approach and “overwhelmingly sided with those
advocating the invalidation of state regulation.” Id. at 1166. In opinions joined by
“Justices who have in other contexts been the champions of state autonomy,” the
modern Court is “finding preemption in over two-thirds of the cases.” Id. at 1166–67.
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Eleventh Amendment interpretations eliminate a range of
312
employment lawsuits.
One of us has similarly argued that hostility to litigation explains
certain statutory and rule interpretation, not just constitutional
313
interpretation.
In discretionary interpretations of matters not
detailed in statutory text, such as how to apply vicarious liability or
limitations periods, the Court makes pro-defense rulings premised on
inconsistent policy arguments, requiring plaintiffs to delay suit in
some cases (on penalty of dismissal for failing to use internal dispute
314
resolution ), but requiring immediate lawsuits in others (on penalty
315
of dismissal under strictly construed limitations periods ). Further
316
evidencing hostility to litigation are decisions disallowing consumer
317
suits against companies that insert mandatory
or employee
arbitration clauses in preprinted materials, and the Wal-Mart Stores
decision that, “[b]y critically examining and rejecting the employees’
statistical, anecdotal, and social science evidence, . . . raised the bar
318
for [commonality] evidence.”
Federal district and appellate courts are even more hostile to
litigation; the Supreme Court issued several unanimous rulings for
319
employment plaintiffs in the 2000s not because it is pro-plaintiff,
312. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (holding that though
Eleventh Amendment text bars only citizens’ suits against other states, that
amendment also bars citizens from suing their own states because the Court has
“‘understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for
the presupposition . . . which it confirms’” (citation omitted)).
313. Scott A. Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two
Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 984 (2007).
314. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806–07 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
315. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 623–24 (2007),
superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5
(to be codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C); Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 104–05 (2002); see also Moss, supra note 313, at 1008–
12 (arguing that a “discovery rule is necessary . . . because good employees may be
slow to conclude that they have suffered discrimination”).
316. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749, 1753 (2011)
(rejecting applicability of state-law unconscionability defense to arbitration
provision).
317. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1461, 1474 (2009) (holding
that arbitration could bar federal lawsuit on statutory rights).
318. Cathleen S. Yonahara, Landmark Supreme Court Ruling Blocks Class-Action
Discrimination Suit, 21 CAL. EMP. L. LETTER 1, 4 (2011).
319. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61–64 (2006)
(reversing circuits deeming only certain retaliatory acts “adverse” enough to be
actionable); Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (per curiam)
(reversing decision on what remarks are probative of discrimination and other
matters); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92, 101 (2003) (holding that
“direct” evidence is not required for certain analyses of whether discrimination was a
“motivating factor”); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153–
54 (2000) (reversing circuits’ pretext-plus rule that disproving employer’s
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but to reverse adventurously pro-defense circuits. For example, in
320
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Court reversed as “inconsistent with
the text” cases imposing a “heightened showing” of “direct” rather
321
than circumstantial evidence for certain claims.
Furthermore, in
322
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the Court had to inform the Eleventh
Circuit that even if the term “boy” could be nondiscriminatory, “it [is]
not . . . always benign” given “context, . . . local custom, and historical
323
usage” : a white Alabama poultry plant supervisor called “boy” the
324
same African-Americans he rejected for jobs.
In sum, courts’ hostility to litigation, shown by their pattern of
pretrial dismissals, may be the most powerful explanation for the
problem this Article diagnoses: judges’ improper self-empowerment
to dismiss collective actions by requiring a high-threshold evidentiary
motion unauthorized by statute, rule, historical practice, or agency
theory.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to explain from various perspectives
how and why courts’ handling of § 216(b) collective actions has been
fundamentally incorrect. As a matter of textual interpretation, courts
are unauthorized to impose in § 216(b) cases the sort of certification
motion requirement and strict commonality inquiry that only Rule 23
requires. As a matter of economic theory, § 216(b) cases do not
feature the asymmetric information and principal-agent problems
that justify the Rule 23 provisions empowering judges to act as
gatekeepers of the filing, representation, and counsel decisions
parties ordinarily make themselves.
As a policy matter, the
certification motion and strict commonality requirements prevent
vindication of important statutory rights that are regularly violated,
but rarely litigated individually. And as a matter of pragmatism, the
labyrinthine two-stage procedure is no necessary evil, given this
Article’s offer of a feasible alternative. From all these perspectives,
the case law is equally wrong, regardless of whether it arose from
innocent path-dependent lock-in of erroneous precedent or whether
it arose from judicial hostility to individual rights litigation. Either
way, § 216(b) collective actions have risen from a once-obscure field
explanation cannot prove discrimination).
320. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
321. Id. at 98 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)).
322. 546 U.S. 454 (2006) (per curiam).
323. Id. at 456 (emphasis added).
324. Id.
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to a major area of high-impact litigation, making courts’ mishandling
of them a troubling error warranting correction.

